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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the
"Commission") adopted new tender offer and Securities Act of 1934
(the "Securities Act") registration exemptive rules for cross-border
tender and exchange offers, business combinations, and rights offer-
ings relating to the securities of foreign companies (the "Cross-Border
Rules")' on January 24, 2000, in the hopes of facilitating U.S. investor
participation in these types of transactions. 2 Capital market partici-
pants are subject to additional compliance costs due to multiple
regulatory requirements.3  Foreign issuers often exclude U.S.
holders4  from foreign tender offers,5  exchange offers,6  rights
1. Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combinations and Rights Of-
ferings, Securities Act Release No. 7759, Exchange Act Release No. 42,054, Trust Indenture
Act Release No. 2378, International Series Release No. 1208, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91 86,214 (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Cross-Border Release].
2. Id. at 82,536.
3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Or-
ganizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAw. 447, 470-73
(1995).
4. The term "U.S. holder" means any security holder resident in the United States of
America, its territories and possessions, any State of the United States, and the District of
Columbia. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,564-65.
5. The term "tender offer" includes tender offers where either cash or stock is issued in
the offer. Cross-Border Tender Offers, Business Combinations and Rights Offerings, 63 Fed.
Reg. 69135, 69136 n.7 (Dec. 15, 1998) [hereinafter Proposing Release].
6. The term "exchange offer" means a tender offer where stock is issued as considera-
tion in the offer. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,564.
Some of our U.S. retail clients are unhappy because they are presently being ex-
cluded from an exchange offer in a multibillion dollar international transaction.
The issuer has a limited percentage of U.S. retail shareholders and is not register-
ing the offer in this country. U.S. retail shareholders were offered $16 per share.
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offerings,7 and business combinations' to avoid compliance with U.S.
securities laws, largely due to these compliance costs and a fear of liti-
gation.9 While U.S. institutional investors are nevertheless often able to
participate in international mergers or exchange offers through their off-
shore offices, U.S. retail investors must sell their securities in the open
market and incur transaction costs, or be "cashed out," recognizing a
gain (or loss) for tax purposes. '° A U.S. holder who wishes to acquire
International shareholders are being offered their choice of $16 per share OR
stock in the successor company. Shortly after the offer was announced, the stock
held by U.S. investors began trading slightly above $16 dollars. The legally fa-
vored international investors were able to purchase the shares from the unfortunate
U.S. retail investors, recognizing the downside risk in the stock was to the cash of-
fer of $16 but that as an international investor, they could participate in all of the
upside potential of the successor company.
If the shares of the successor company increase before the deal is consummated,
there is the potential for a profitable arbitrage by international investors which can
purchase the shares of the target company and convert them into shares of the suc-
cessor company. This potential for international investors to take advantage of the
U.S. shareholders by paying them less than the international value of their U.S.
holdings, is caused by the U.S. securities regulations.
Letter from Michael W. Reinhardt, House Counsel, Ragen MacKenzie Incorporated, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 14, 1998) at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72998/reinharl.txt [hereinafter Ragen MacKenzie Let-
ter].
7. The term "rights offering" means offers and sales for cash of equity securities
where:
(1) The issuer grants the existing security holders of a particular class of eq-
uity securities (including holders of depositary receipts evidencing those
securities) the right to purchase or subscribe for additional securities of
that class; and
(2) The number of additional shares an existing security holder may purchase
initially is in proportion to the number of securities he or she holds of re-
cord on the record date for the rights offering. If an existing security
holder holds depositary receipts, the proportion must be calculated as if
the underlying securities were held directly.
Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,564.
8. Business combination means a statutory amalgamation, merger, arrangement or
other reorganization requiring the vote of securities holders of one or more of the participat-
ing companies. It also includes a statutory short form merger that does not require a vote of
security holders. Id.
9. See, e.g., letter from James W. Lovely to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (Dec. 30, 1998) at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s72998/lovelyl.txt (offering that "foreign private issuers routinely use the veil of 'onerous
and complex ... laws' not only to avoid offering free rights, warrants and other securities to
U.S. investors .... but also to avoid payment.., of cash in lieu of such securities").
10. See Ragen MacKenzie Letter, supra note 6 (noting that U.S. investors must often
make transactional decisions without the benefit of any disclosure required by foreign law).
U.S. investors not only can be deprived of the opportunity to realize significant value on
their investments in foreign securities by tendering into a favorable offer, they also must
decide whether to retain their securities or sell into the secondary market without the disclo-
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equity in the successor international entity must purchase shares on the
open market, also incurring transaction costs, while international hold-
ers may convert their shares on a tax-free basis and without incurring
such transaction costs."
In 1997, the U.K. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the "Takeover
Panel") reviewed 31 tender offers.'2
When the U.S. ownership of the target was less than 15% (30
offers), the bidders excluded U.S. persons in all of the offers.
When the U.S. ownership was more significant, such as 38%
(one offer), the bidders included U.S. persons. In the 30 offers
that excluded U.S. persons, the ownership percentage was as
follows: in 27 offers, U.S. persons held less than 5%; in the re-
maining three offers, U.S. persons held 7%, 8% and 10-15%,
respectively."
Fundamental changes in domestic and foreign securities markets
due to internationalization put pressure on the sexagenarian U.S. securi-
ties regulatory system, originally developed during the New Deal.'4 The
SEC acknowledges that some jurisdictions have permitted foreign issu-
ers and bidders to exclude U.S. holders in spite of domestic
requirements to treat all holders equally, on the basis that it would be
impractical to require the issuer or bidder to include the U.S. holders."
By removing regulatory barriers, e.g., by reducing the registration re-
quirements of cross-border transactions, the SEC hopes U.S. investors
will be included in more transactions involving foreign issuers and U.S.
holders will participate on an equal basis with foreign security holders.'
6
Many theorists argue that regulatory competition forces regulators
operating independently to promulgate rules that they believe will make
their domestic markets most attractive to participants. '" Both investors
and issuers of securities arguably benefit from this competition in the
sure and procedural safeguards afforded by the regulatory scheme applicable in the U.S. or
in the relevant foreign jurisdiction. Concept Release on Multinational Tender and Exchange
Offers, Securities Act Rel. No. 6866, 55 Fed. Reg. 23751 (June 6, 1990) [hereinafter Con-
cept Release].
I1. Ragen MacKenzie Letter, supra note 6.
12. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,539 n.8.
13. Id.
14. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should
Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2532 (1997).
15. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,539.
16. Id.; see also Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure
Rules in the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 241, 266 (arguing that foreign issu-
ers participating in U.S. markets provide jobs and fees to the U.S. financial industry,
increased liquidity, and leverage to influence world disclosure standards).
17. See, e.g., Geiger, supra note 16, at 268.
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form of a regulatory hierarchy that develops among international capital
markets." Market participants can migrate to jurisdictions imposing a
preferred regulatory burden, producing a phenomenon known as
"regulatory arbitrage."' 9
Some critics dispute whether a hierarchy of securities regulation is
viable, however, arguing that regulatory arbitrage exerts a downward
pressure on those jurisdictions that compete to retain the activity, hence
a "race to the bottom., 20 They suggest that legislators and regulators
ought to rely more heavily on harmonization as an alternative to regu-
latory competition. 2' Regulations may be harmonized through
reciprocity or commonality; the former requires deference to the stan-
dards of another jurisdiction, while the latter requires regulators to
develop substantially uniform standards to govern specific issues in dif-
ferent jurisdictions.2 ' This note suggests that the Cross-Border Rules
represent an early manifestation of a harmonization approach.
This note introduces the Cross-Border Rules in the context of the
rapidly changing securities markets and highly competitive regulatory
systems noted above. It addresses the elements and impact of interna-
tionalization on cross-border tender offers and the modern U.S.
regulatory response. The SEC has avoided any public moves to harmo-
nize the U.S. system with those of other major capital markets and has
instead made incremental changes aimed at maintaining the system's
perceived strengths. The Cross-Border Rules represent a somewhat un-
gainly attempt to placate U.S. investors by bending the Williams Act
tender offer rules using exemptions for certain transactions.
The SEC will now exempt certain tender offers for the securities of
foreign private issuers23 from the provisions of the Exchange Act and
the rules thereunder that govern tender offers.' Bidders may use the ex-
emption when U.S. security holders hold of record ten percent or less of
the subject securities. The subject company, or any officer, director, or
other person who otherwise would be obligated to file Schedule 14D-9,
18. James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1200 (1999).
19. Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation
in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563, 567 (1998).
20. The term "race [to] the bottom" was used to describe the competition for corporate
charters by William L. Cary in Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
21. Geiger, supra note 16, at 297-316.
22. Id. at 271-72.
23. "Foreign private issuer means the same as in § 230.405 of Regulation C." Cross-
Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,564.
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e), 78n(d) (1994); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4, 14d-1 to 14d-10,
14e-l, and 14e-2 (2000).
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may also rely on this exemption. The SEC-and this note-refer to this
relief as the Tier I exemption.
The SEC will offer limited exemptive relief from tender offer regu-
lations when U.S. security holders hold of record more than ten percent,
but not more than forty percent, of the subject class, to eliminate areas
of frequent conflict between U.S. and foreign regulatory requirements.
This represents a codification of current Commission exemptive and
interpretive decisions, as well as an effort to harmonize U.S. regulations
with tender offer regulation and practice in the United Kingdom. 25 The
SEC-and this note-refers to this relief as the Tier II exemption.
Foreign private issuers may rely upon Rule 801 in certain rights of-
ferings, whereby the equity securities they issue are exempt from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act. An issuer may rely on
this exemption when U.S. security holders hold of record no more than
ten percent of its securities that are the subject of the rights offering.
Under Rule 802, securities issued in exchange offers for foreign private
issuers' securities are exempt from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act")2 6 and the qualification act
of the Trust Indenture Act of 1940 (the "Trust Indenture Act").27 Securi-
ties issued in certain business combinations involving foreign private
issuers are also exempt under Rule 802. This exemption similarly ap-
plies when U.S. security holders hold of record no more than ten percent
of the subject class of securities.
Tender offers for the securities of foreign private issuers are exempt
from new Rule 14e-5 (formerly Rule lOb-13) 28 under the Exchange Act.
A bidder may make purchases outside a tender offer during the offer
when U.S. security holders hold of record no more than ten percent of
the securities subject to the offer.29 Furthermore, the Directors of the
Division of Corporation Finance and Market Regulation may exempt
tender offers from specific tender offer requirements. ° The U.S. anti-
fraud and anti-manipulation rules continue to apply, as the SEC believes
U.S. security holders participating in these cross-border transactions
ought to retain a minimum level of protection. The Commission notes
25. See Roberta S. Karmel, Facilitation of Multijurisdictional Offerings, N.Y.L.J., April
15, 1999, at 3.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1994).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-bbbb (1994).
28. Rule 1Ob-13 was revised and redesignated as Rule 14e-5 in Regulation of Takeovers
and Security Holder Communications, Securities Act Release No. 7760, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 42,055, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,107, [1999-2000 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 86,215, at 82,608 (October 22, 1999).
29. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,539-40.
30. Id. at 82,540; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78mm(a) (Supp. V 1999).
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that the omission of information required by U.S. forms to fulfill foreign
disclosure requirements and practices will not necessarily violate U.S.
disclosure requirements, however. The Commission and investors may
bring anti-fraud actions if the omitted information is material in the
context of the transaction and the omission makes the disclosure mis-
leading.3
Part I of this note offers a modest analysis of the rapid internation-
alization of capital markets and its impact on tender and exchange
offers, business combinations, and rights offerings. An appreciation of
this trend is vital to a sophisticated understanding of regulatory compe-
tition and harmonization.
Part II takes a step back to review the applicability of U.S. securities
laws to cross-border offers. Conventional wisdom views U.S. securities
regulation as both strict and expansive. A certain amount of historical
and statutory perspective will help the reader evaluate the merits of dif-
fering regulatory philosophies.
Part III presents the Cross-Border Rules in detail. While it is too
early to determine their impact on cross-border tender offers, the SEC
invested a great deal of effort in their drafting to strike a sensible bal-
ance of investor protection and regulatory flexibility.
Part IV develops a normative analysis of the U.S. regulation of
cross-border offers and considers the new Cross-Border Rules within
the regulatory competition and harmonization paradigms.
Part V describes tender offer regulation in Germany and contrasts
U.S. tender offer rules with the German regulatory model to illustrate a
non-governmental, self-regulatory alternative.
Part VI highlights Vodafone AirTouch's hostile offer for Mannes-
mann, which provides an excellent case study of the impact of various
securities regulatory systems on a cross-border transaction.
The movement to harmonize worldwide regulatory standards faces
substantial political hurdles. While noting a number of weaknesses, this
note largely endorses the SEC's recent efforts to allow U.S. investors to
reap additional benefits of cross-border investment. Nonetheless, inter-
nationalization (especially in the form of technological innovation) will
likely force the SEC to reassess its role as the "investor's advocate.
32
31. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,540.
32. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Web site at www.sec.gov (last visited
February 15, 2001).
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I. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TENDER AND EXCHANGE
OFFERS, BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, AND RIGHTS OFFERINGS
A. Global Change in Capital Markets
As Uri Geiger notes, "[t]rade in foreign equity now amounts to
about 35% of private sector cross-border capital flow in securities, as
compared with 5% in the early 1980s.""3 Net purchases of foreign
stocks by U.S. investors grew from less than $3 billion throughout the
1980s to more than $50 billion in 1995. 34 There were 441 foreign list-
ings on NASDAQ, 392 on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"),
62 on the American Stock Exchange, and 522 on the London Stock
Exchange by the end of 1998."5 While non-U.S. companies now make
up thirteen percent of NYSE's listings, the exchange anticipates that it
will grow to twenty-five percent of all listed companies in the next
five years.36 More than 1,100 foreign companies were reporting to the
SEC under the Exchange Act by June 1998. 3' Furthermore, the number
of European cross-border mergers and acquisitions increased from
1,434 in 1991 to 1,648 in 1997.38
Economic forces, technological innovation, and regulatory change
have contributed to the internationalization of securities markets
(which Uri Geiger defines as an increase in "transactions involv[ing]
participants and financial assets from different nations").39 The oil cri-
sis of the 1970s, the U.S. deficit of the 1980s, the collapse of
Communism, and economic reforms in China, Latin America, and
Southeast Asia created capital market imbalances. 40 Furthermore, as
an internationally diversified portfolio provides a significantly greater
degree of risk reduction than a portfolio composed only of domestic
shares, investors seek investment opportunities abroad.4 , Institutional
33. Geiger, supra note 16, at 249.
34. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Bulletin, tbl. CM-D
(Net Purchases of Long-Term Securities by U.S. Investors) (Dec. 1996).
35. See London Stock Exchange Web site, at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/
(last visited on February 15, 2001).
36. New York Stock Exchange, Non-U.S. Listed Companies, at http://www.nyse.com/
international/internationalco.html (last visited February 15, 2001) [hereinafter NYSE Non-
U.S. Companies].
37. See Cross Border Tender Offerings, Business Combinations and Rights Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 7611, Exchange Act Release No. 40,678, International Series
Release No. 1171, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,060, at 81,059 n.22
(Nov. 13, 1998).
38. Id. at 81,060 n.23.
39. Geiger, supra note 16, at 247.
40. Id. at 250.
41. Id. at 251-52; see also Henry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952)
(proposing the portfolio theory).
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investors and mutual funds, which benefit from greater sophistication
and ability to trade internationally, dominate capital markets. 2 Tech-
nological advances in communications provide the basic conditions
and liquidity for international securities markets, and the development




London's position as a major financial center was reinforced by
the "Big Bang," a 1986 regulatory change that eliminated fixed com-
mission rates, opened London Stock Exchange membership to foreign
banks, and replaced old floor trading with the Stock Exchange Auto-
mated Quotation System (SEAQ). 4 U.K. regulators lowered the
barriers to entry further in 1994 with the "Red Book" guidelines,
which allowed foreign issuers that wished to list their Global Deposi-
tary Receipts to satisfy only minimal requirements based on home
disclosure rules.45
The SEC reduced U.S. disclosure requirements for foreign issu-
ers too. 46 Foreign issuers that offer securities in the United States
need not prepare their financial statements in accordance with U.S.
GAAP and may instead select any comprehensive body of account-
ing principles, as long as they reconcile the information to U.S.
GAAP.47 They may also limit their disclosure of directors' and offi-
cers' compensation.4 ' First-time registrants are now only required to
reconcile their financial statements for the last two years. 49 The SEC
42. See Geiger, supra note 16, at 251.
43. Id. at 253.
44. Id. at 254.
45. See Cox, supra note 18, at 1226 n.90.
46. See id. at 1208-09 (stating that although the SEC has the authority to prescribe ac-
counting and auditing standards that SEC documents must meet, it generally defers to the
private sector).
47. The difference between U.S. GAAP and other standards may be significant. When
Daimler-Benz, A.G. ("Daimler-Benz") listed on the NYSE, it was required to reconcile its
German-prepared financial statements to U.S. GAAP. Liberal German accounting standards
allowed Daimler-Benz's management to "smooth" its earnings; they concealed "reserve"
earnings in good years to draw upon later in poor years. In the year of its listing, Daimler-
Benz reported a $354 million profit under German accounting standards, and $1 billion loss
under U.S. GAAP. The switch to U.S. GAAP increased the transparency of management
activity, and led to wholesale changes in Daimler-Benz's structure. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.,
Before Chrysler, Daimler Was a Soap Opera, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at A19.
48. See EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURI-
TIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS 2-103 to 2-104 (5th ed. 2000).
49. Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Companies;
Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker-Dealer Re-
ports, Securities Act Release No. 7053, Exchange Act Release No. 33,918, International
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adopted Rule 144A5" and Regulation S,5 which have had a significant
effect on internationalization. Rule 144A created a market for securities
offered to institutional investors, useful to foreign investors that wish to
avoid the burden of complying with Securities Act registration require-
ments." Without Rule 144A, shares that have not.been registered with
the SEC cannot be sold for a year, and then only pursuant to limitations
regarding the availability of public information, volume of shares sold,
and the manner of sale. 3 Regulation S eliminates the registration re-
quirements for many offshore transactions and enhances the
predictability of the application of U.S. securities laws to offshore of-
ferings. 4 By lowering the standards for foreign issuers, however, the
SEC invites criticism from domestic issuers who face the higher costs
and greater risk of competitive injury."
C. Global Change Among the Participants
1. Investors
Investors benefit from international diversification and the opportu-
nity for increased risk-adjusted returns by investing in the securities of
foreign issuers."6 They can thereby reduce the systemic risk associated
with domestic securities and exploit opportunities to outperform the
domestic markets.57 Nevertheless, Merritt Fox argues that the patterns of
holding indicate that markets remain far from fully international. 8 In-
Series Release No. 653, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,331, at
85,206 (Apr. 19, 1994).
50. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2000); Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to the
Method of Determining Holding Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145,
Securities Act Release No. 6862, Exchange Act Release No. 27,928, Investment Company
Act Release No. 17,452, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,523, at
80,638 (Apr. 23, 1990).
51. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Act Release
No. 27,942, Investment Company Act Release No. 17,458, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,524, at 80,661 (Apr. 24, 1990).
52. See D. Rhett Brandon, International Offerings, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION 15, 21-22 (Nis Jul Clausen ed., 1991).
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 144A(d) (2000).
54. See Brandon, supra note 52, at 19-21.
55. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 641, 696-97 (1999).
56. Geiger, supra note 16, at 260.
57. Id. at 260. Investors looking abroad naturally risk underperforming domestic mar-
kets as well. Id. n.79; see also RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 368-77 (6th ed. 2000) (the efficient capital market theory suggests that
the performance of domestic and foreign portfolios should be substantially equal in the long
run).
58. Fox, supra note 14, at 2508.
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vestors in different countries have access to significantly different in-
formation resources.59 Market forces will continue to increase the
percentage of foreign ownership of most corporations and increase the
importance of cross-border transactions, however, putting pressure on
existing securities regulatory systems.6
2. Issuers
Foreign issuers choose to list on U.S. exchanges to increase the
marketability of their securities, to facilitate U.S. mergers and acquisi-
tions through the use of a U.S.-listed security as an acquisition616
currency, and to draw upon additional capital.62 Some issuers are con-
strained by domestic markets that are unable to supply their capital
requirements.63 In addition to improved liquidity, decreased exposure to
domestic market risk will often boost share value and reduce the cost of
capital. 64 If an issuer lists its securities in both domestic and foreign
markets, the influence of the foreign market on the firm's stock returns
will likely increase and the influence of the domestic market will de-
crease. Unless the foreign and domestic markets are perfectly
correlated, the issuer will benefit from a diversification effect.6 Fur-
thermore, a multiple listing is likely to create greater interest in the
stock and increase the number of shareholders, spurring analysts to pro-
duce more information about the stock.66
A foreign firm's announcement of a dual listing on a U.S. exchange
typically increases share value, 67 despite the costs of complying with
U.S. regulation.68 The U.S. securities market, with strict mandatory dis-
closure rules and a vast industry of securities houses and analysts, seems
to operate as a powerful monitoring and pricing system relative to other
59. Id. at 2512.
60. Id. at 2531.
61. Daimler-Benz stock would have been much less attractive to Chrysler holders in
1998 had Daimler not listed on the NYSE in 1993. Coffee, supra note 55, at 676-77. In
contrast, Deutsche Bank, which was not listed on the NYSE, paid cash for Bankers Trust. Id.
at 681 n.138.
62. NYSE Non-U.S. Companies, supra note 36.
63. Geiger, supra note 16, at 259. This may be the case for companies in developing
markets, undergoing privatization, or from countries like Germany with small domestic eq-
uity markets. Id.
64. Id. at 258; see Coffee, supra note 55, at 674.
65. See Licht, supra note 19, at 584.
66. Id. at 600.
67. See id. at 582-83.
68. See generally Coffee, supra note 55, at 683-91 (exploring the costs of complying
with U.S. regulation). Professor Fox estimates that compliance with U.S. securities system
cost approximately $1.6 billion in 1995. Fox, supra note 14, at 2501 (citing NEw YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1995, at 9 (1996)).
Fall 2000]
Michigan Journal of International Law
markets. 69 A U.S. listing may represent a bonding mechanism, "a credi-
ble and binding commitment by [a foreign] issuer not to exploit
whatever discretion it enjoys under foreign law to overreach the mi-
nority investor."" Investors reward an issuer that agrees to comply
with U.S. disclosure standards with a higher share price. However,
some critics question the investor protection value of mandating U.S.
securities regulation for foreign issuers, since managers seeking to bond
their actions would select the higher standard anyway."
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF U.S. SECURITIES
LAWS TO CROSS-BORDER OFFERS
The determination of which government may regulate a cross-
border tender offer depends on whether the company is registered under
the Exchange Act, where the bidder and the target company are incorpo-
rated, where the securities of the bidder are listed and traded, whether
the securities of the bidder are owned in part by nonresident investors,
and where the offer is made.72 The SEC regulates offers and transactions
in foreign securities that occur within U.S. borders, in addition to those
where the United States is the target's home country or site of incorpo-
ration' U.S. tender offer rules may violate the law or practices of
foreign countries, however, and increase the cost and uncertainty of the
offer.74 Uncertainty in cross-border offers arises from the following ar-
eas of conflict: "(1) ownership reporting and mandatory offers, (2)
commencement of the offering, (3) minimum offering periods, (4) with-
drawal rights, (5) purchases outside the bid, (6) defensive tactics, and
(7) disclosure obligations. 75
69. Licht, supra note 19, at 582-83.
70. Coffee, supra note 55, at 691.
71. See Fox, supra note 14.
72. See Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Ten-
der Offers, 87 Nw. U.L. REV. 523, 528-29 (1993).
73. International Tender and Exchange Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6897, Ex-
change Act Release No. 29,275, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2266, International Series
Release No. 285, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,803, at 81,746 (June
5, 1991).
74. See Fisch, supra note 72, at 529-30. Uncertainty may come in the form of litigation
under the Williams Act, initiated by the target or investors. Even deliberately excluding U.S.
shareholders may not avoid this, for a court may determine that the offer's effects on the
United States are sufficient to justify imposition of U.S. laws. Id. at 534.
75. Edward F. Greene, Andrew Curran & David A. Christman, Toward a Cohesive In-




I A. The Williams Act
The SEC regulates tender offers pursuant to the Williams Act,76
which amended the Exchange Act in 1968. Congress enacted the Wil-
liams Act to address the secretiveness of block purchases and significant
rapid accumulations of stock and their perceived danger to corporate
control.77 The Williams Act aims to protect investors in proxy and take-
over contests by requiring certain bidders to disclose their actions and
provides investors with equal or fair rights to participate in the tender
offer.78 A target company or investors might bring suit to force a bidder
to comply with the Williams Act's procedural or disclosure provisions
or to obtain injunctive relief under Section 14(e). The defensive tactics
some U.S. issuers use to repel active bidders and discourage potential
ones are a phenomenon of state corporate law, and federal securities
laws do not address a corporation's ability to adopt such measures.7 9
1. The Scope of Tender Offers
The SEC was unsuccessful in its attempts to convince Congress to
codify the definition of "tender offer" as
any offer to purchase more than five percent of a class of secu-
rities made to more than ten persons (except for certain brokers'
transactions) or an offer that is disseminated in a wide-spread
manner, provides for a price which represents a premium in ex-
cess of five percent or two dollars above the current market
price, and does not provide for a meaningful opportunity to ne-
gotiate the price and terms.8°
Courts have accepted an alternative definition comprising an eight-
factor test,' which identifies a tender offer by the active and widespread
solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer, solicitation
76. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1994)).
77. Fisch, supra note 72, at 525-26; Roberta S. Karmel, Transnational Takeover Talk-
Regulations Relating to Tender Offers and Insider Trading in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1998).
78. See 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("S. 510 is designed
solely to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors.").
79. Greene, supra note 75, at 848. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994) provides: "Nothing in
this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission ... of any State over
any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter
or the rules and regulations thereunder."
80. Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,385,
44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,349-52 (Dec. 6, 1979) (Proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(1)); Karmel, supra
note 77, at 1136.
81. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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of a substantial percentage of the issuer's securities, offer of a premium
over prevailing market price, fixed rather than negotiable terms, limited
duration of offer, offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of
shares, offerees subject to pressure to sell their stock, and a public an-
nouncement preceded or followed by a rapid accumulation of stock.82 A
tender offer might include "any public invitation to a corporation's
shareholders to purchase their stock," even if it is not a "hostile bid op-
posed by incumbent management."
83
2. Disclosure Requirements
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act requires any person who ac-
quires a beneficial interest of five percent or more of any class of equity
security subject to the annual and periodic reporting provisions of the
Exchange Act (e.g., publicly traded issuers' common stock) to file a
statement of ownership with the SEC, any exchange which lists the se-
curities, and the issuer within ten days following the acquisition.84 This
applies whether or not the issuer of the securities is a U.S. company.
Schedule 13D requires disclosure regarding the person or group making
the five percent acquisition, its officers, directors, and principle busi-
ness, as well as any financing arrangements supporting the purchase.85
The purchaser must disclose its future intentions with regard to the tar-
get company, e.g., whether the purchaser intends to make a tender offer
for the target or enter into some other control transaction. 6 This disclo-
sure is "aimed at creeping acquisitions and open market or privately
negotiated large block purchases."87
The bidder must also file a Schedule 14D disclosure statement con-
taining certain information regarding the bid with the SEC88 and must
disclose any "material" financial information.89 If a target's shares are
82. See 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.13 (3d ed.
1996).
83. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
84. Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
85. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2000).
86. See id.
87. Karmel, supra note 77, at 1136.
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (2000).
89. Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Tender Offer, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5844, Exchange Act Release No. 13,787, Investment Company Act Release No.
9862, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 81,256 (July 21, 1977)
(including, without limitation:
(1) the terms of the tender offer, particularly those terms concerning the
amount of securities being sought, such as any or all, a fixed minimum
with the right to accept additional shares tendered, all or none, and a fixed
percentage of the outstanding;
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registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, a bidder must file
Schedule 14D-1 and amend it to reflect material changes in informa-
tion.90 Though Section 14D is inapplicable if the shares are not
registered under Section 12, the bidder must nevertheless prepare a dis-




Under Rule 14d-2(b) of the Exchange Act, a bidder for shares reg-
istered under the Exchange Act must commence its offer within five
days of a public announcement that includes the price or a range of
prices to be offered and the number of securities sought.92 A tender offer
must be held open for a minimum of twenty business days under Rule
14e-1 (a), whether or not the securities are registered under Section 12 of
the Exchange Act.93 If the bidder changes the offer price, number, or
percentage of outstanding securities, the offer must remain open for at
least ten days following the change.94 Although Section 14(d)(5) origi-
nally guaranteed that a shareholder who tenders shares registered under
Section 12 pursuant to a bid may withdraw them at any time up to seven
days from commencement or more than sixty days after commence-
ment, the SEC extended these withdrawal rights until the tender offer
expires9 If an offer is oversubscribed, shareholders must be treated on a
pro rata basis. 96 To ensure that all holders are treated equally, bidders
and their financial advisors may not purchase a target company's secu-
rities outside the tender offer, regardless of whether the securities are
registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act.97
(2) whether the purpose of the tender offer is for control of the subject com-
pany;
(3) the plans or proposals of the bidder described in Item 5 of the Schedule;
and
(4) the ability of the bidder to pay for the securities sought in the tender offer
and/or to repay any loans made [to] the bidder ....
90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (2000).
91. Id.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (2000).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (2000).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(b) (2000).
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (2000).
96. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1O(b)-13(c) (2000).
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-13 (2000) (this prohibition applies to the advisors' mar-
ket making affiliates as well).
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4. Anti-fraud Provision
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act98 contains a general tender offer
anti-fraud provision, prohibiting participants from using all fraudulent,
deceptive, and manipulative acts and practices in connection with a ten-
der offer. The provision applies to false statements by both the bidder
and the target, statements contained in the tender offer documents, and
other statements made in the course of a tender offer. Section 14(e) is
aimed at misrepresentation or nondisclosure rather than the substantive
fairness of a transaction.99 If a party possesses material non-public in-
formation regarding the issuer's securities, the Exchange Act's anti-
fraud provisions may require the party either to disclose the non-public
information or to refrain from purchasing the securities.'00
5. Exchange Offers
If the bidder offers the target's shareholders securities as part or all
of the consideration, the bidder must register the offered shares with the
SEC. A non-U.S. offeror must disclose "(1) a detailed description of the
offer, (2) a business description of both the bidder and the target, (3)
audited balance sheets for the two most recent fiscal years, and (4)
audited income statements for the three most recent fiscal years
(accompanied by the auditors' opinions and consents)."'' If the acquisi-
tion is material to the bidder, it must prepare a pro forma income
statement and balance sheet that presents the business that would result
from a successful takeover.
12
B. Extraterritoriality
U.S. courts have traditionally viewed jurisdiction expansively, ap-
plying jurisdiction to transactions with minimal U.S. contacts. 3 The
territorial conduct test establishes jurisdiction based on location.'04 A
court may look to a number of factors to determine the location of a se-
curities transaction. The Second Circuit test' °  applies anti-fraud
provisions to losses from sales of securities to U.S. residents in the
United States, whether or not there were acts (or culpable failures to act)
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
99. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
100. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(b) (2000).
101. Greene, supra note 75, at 853-54.
102. Id.
103. See Fisch, supra note 72, at 523.
104. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 166 F. 261 (2d Cir. 1908).
105. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974, 991-92 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
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of material importance in this country, as well as to losses from sales of
securities to American residents abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable
failures to act) of material importance in the United States have signifi-
cantly contributed thereto. However, the test does not apply to losses
from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States unless
acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States directly caused
such losses. "Merely preparatory" acts do not trigger jurisdiction, a test
that was later adopted by the D.C. Circuit.' 6 In a more expansive ver-
sion of the test adopted by the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits,
jurisdiction exists "where at least some of the activity designed to fur-
ther a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country." Here, even
preparatory acts (e.g., phone calls, soliciting foreign investors in the
United States) may trigger jurisdiction. 07 The Second Circuit test, on the
other hand, requires substantial fraudulent activity in the United States.
Other courts have more relaxed tests; e.g., a single meeting in the
United States between foreigners in a transaction which is otherwise
conducted abroad and involves no offer or sale in the U.S. markets may
subject the transaction to domestic law by the application of a conduct
test.
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook established the extraterritorial effects
test.
[T]he district court has subject matter jurisdiction over viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act although the transactions
which are alleged to violate the Act take place outside the
United States, at least when the transactions involve stocks reg-
istered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are
detrimental to the interests of American investors.' 8
A listing on a U.S. exchange is an important element in generating
enough of an effect on the U.S. capital markets to justify jurisdiction.
Some critics believe SEC regulation of tender offers should be ad-
dressed as a matter of choice-of-law, not subject matter jurisdiction. The
United States should apply its securities laws restrictively, based on an
interest analysis.'" A comity test requires not just balancing tests but
also deferral to the objectives of a foreign state. The Supreme Court has
defined comity as "the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
106. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
107. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 217 (1996).
108. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. May 29, 1968).
109. See Fisch, supra note 72, at 556-61.
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rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protec-
tion of its laws."''1
Some argue that the rule of extraterritoriality should be a bright-line
rule, whereby parties can make ex ante law choices from a variety of
options available. Parties should be able to avoid their domestic laws if
they want.'' Alternatives to extraterritoriality include portable reciproc-
ity, whereby issuers may follow the law of a country other than the
country where the securities are actually traded. Investors can invest in
companies on their home exchanges based on another country's rules.
International company registration would register companies rather than
transactions, but the question of how much information to require of a
company remains.
C. Transactional Options Before the Adoption
of the Cross-Border Rules
As noted above, cross-border offers often create tensions between
various regulatory systems, particularly in the following areas:
"(1) ownership reporting and mandatory offers, (2) commencement of
the offering, (3) minimum offer periods, (4) withdrawal rights, (5) pur-
chases outside the bid, (6) defensive tactics, and (7) disclosure
obligations."' 2 Offerors for securities of foreign issuers can structure
their transactions in a number of ways, or seek exemptions from the
SEC, to avoid violating U.S. and foreign securities laws. An offeror can
make offers directly to all shareholders (including those in the United
States) and comply fully with the Williams Act. If the percentage of
U.S. ownership is small, the offeror can make an offer that was closed
to U.S. residents, e.g., by not mailing offering documents into the
United States, announcing the offer in the U.S. press, or accepting ten-
ders made from the United States. U.S. investors are then barred from
tendering directly to the offeror and must either tender from outside the
United States or sell directly into the arbitrage market, not benefiting
from any premium and incurring substantial transaction costs in either
case. If the offer is an exchange offer, U.S. security holders are not able
to participate in the resulting company. U.S. investors must make these
decisions without the benefit of U.S.-style (Williams Act) disclosure,
and sometimes without any disclosure at all.
In addition, an offeror could negotiate with the SEC for transaction
structures that complied with both U.S. and foreign law-a very costly,
110. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
111. See Choi, supra note 107, at 226.
112. Greene, supra note 75, at 836.
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uncertain process that effectively subjects bidders to U.S. securities
laws.' 3 Typically, the SEC grants such relief in the form of "no-action"
letters, which assure the recipient that the SEC will not recommend en-
forcement of activity that would otherwise constitute regulatory
violations."4 For example, the Ford-Jaguar." and Procordia-Volvo-
Pharmacia ' 6 transactions were both structured as two separate tender
offers, one made to U.S. holders, which complied with the Williams
Act, and one made abroad, which complied with the applicable foreign
law."' In the former transaction, Ford U.K. offered to buy Jaguar, a U.K.
company. Americans owned approximately twenty-five percent of Jag-
uar stock in the form of ADRs"8 and owned a small portion directly. In
the United Kingdom, the non-statutory Takeover Panel issues and ad-
ministrates the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the "City
Code")," 9 which contains a set of ten general principles expressed in
broad terms and a set of more detailed rules that provide guidance in
specific instances.2 The Code's rules and principles, though lacking the
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8)(C) (1994) (authorizing the SEC to exempt transactions
from the provisions of § 14(d) that are "not comprehended within the purposes of this sub-
section"); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1994) (authorizing the SEC to modify statutory withdrawal
rights).
114. Greene, supra note 75, at 834.
115. In the matter of the Ford Motor Company Limited Offer to Purchase the Ordinary
Shares and American Depositary Receipts of Jaguar PLC, Exchange Act Release No. 27,425,
1989 SEC LEXIS 2161, at *2 (Nov. 7, 1989).
116. In the Matter of Procordia Aktiebolag and Aktiebolaget Volvo Offers to Purchase
the Shares, Convertible Debentures and American Depositary Shares of Pharmacia Aktiebo-
lag, Exchange Act Release No. 27,671, International Series Release No. 118, [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 84,514 (Feb. 2, 1990).
117. Fisch, supra note 72, at 534-35.
118. An American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a certificate issued by a U.S. deposi-
tary bank that represents shares of a non-U.S. company that are deposited with the bank as a
custodian. See Joseph Velli, American Depositary Receipts: An Overview, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. S38, S39 (1994).
119. PANEL ON TAKEOVERS & MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERG-
ERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITION OF SHARES (5th ed. 1996)
[hereinafter CITY CODE].
120. The ten General Principles of the City Code require that
(1) all shareholders of the same class be treated similarly; (2) during an offer, the
offeror, offeree and their advisors provide all shareholders with the same informa-
tion; (3) an announcement should only be made when the offeror is sure it can
implement the offer; (4) shareholders should be given, and allowed, sufficient
time to consider all relevant information; (5) any document or advertisement for
shareholders be prepared with great care and accuracy; (6) all parties to an offer
act to prevent the creation of a false market in the securities of any party to that
offer; (7) if a bona fide offer has been made or is imminent, no action should be
taken to frustrate that offer without approval of the shareholders; (8) rights of
control be exercised in good faith; (9) directors only have regard to shareholder,
employee and creditor interests when giving advice to shareholders; and
(10) where control of a company is acquired by persons acting in concert or con-
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force of law, play a central role in takeover regulation. 2' The Williams
Act and the U.K. City Code conflicted sufficiently to prevent a tender
offer by Ford that met the procedural requirements of both statutes." 2
Ford made two different offers: one to U.S. shareholders, in compliance
with the Williams Act, and another to non-U.S. Jaguar shareholders on
the same terms, in compliance with the U.K. City Code. 23 The SEC ap-
proved this bifurcated procedure and granted no-action relief from the
"all-holders" provision of Rule 14d-10 and other provisions governing
withdrawal rights. 24 The SEC granted the Procordia-Volvo-Pharmacia
transaction similar no-action relief based on a bifurcated tender offer.
Although all three were Swedish companies, Pharmacia was registered
under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, as U.S. investors held approxi-
mately eight percent of its equity directly or indirectly (as ADRs).'
25
D. Early Reform Efforts
The Cross-Border Rules have their genesis in the 1990 Concept
Release on Multinational Tender and Exchange Offers. 26 In response to
cross-border tender offers such as Jaguar and Pharmacia, the SEC pro-
posed an approach that would encourage foreign bidders to include U.S.
investors in their tender offers and facilitate the making of such offers in
cases where the number of U.S. investors was small.'27 The SEC sought
to insure that investors would have the opportunity to participate and
that they would receive adequate information to make a decision.2 The
SEC implemented the multijurisdictional disclosure concept ("MJDS")
solidating their interest, the persons involved be normally required to make a gen-
eral offer to the other shareholders.
Greene, supra note 75, at 830 n.29 (citing CITY CODE, supra note 119, at BI-B2).
121. Greene, supra note 75, at 832. The Panel may discipline violators of the Code,
which "severely diminish[es]" their professional standing. Id. n.43 (citing William Staple,
The Takeover Panel, in A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS 1, 11 (1996)).
122. "[Allthough U.S. tender offer regulations require the bidder to provide withdrawal
rights throughout the offering period, the rules in the United Kingdom do not permit with-
drawal rights during the initial twenty-one days of the offer. The U.K. provisions also
require the offer to be extended for an additional fourteen day period after it becomes
'unconditional as to acceptances.'" Fisch, supra note 72, at 535 (citing CITY CODE, supra
note 119, Rules 31.4, 34, at M2, M13).
123. See Fisch, supra note 72, at 535 (citing Ford Release, supra note 115, at *4).
124. See id. at 535-36.
125. See id. at 536 (citing In the Matter of Procordia Aktiebolag and Aktiebolaget
Volvo Offers to Purchase the Shares, Convertible Debentures and American Depositary
Shares of Pharmacia Aktiebolag, Exchange Act Release No. 27,671, [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,514, at 80,586 (Feb. 2, 1990)).
126. Concept Release, supra note 10.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 23,752.
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in 1991, providing U.S. and Canadian companies with a predetermined
set of disclosure rules. Offers for Canadian issuers may proceed under
Canadian law, as long as U.S. investors hold less than forty percent of
the securities subject to the tender offer and the offer is open to all U.S.
holders with terms and conditions no less favorable than those offered
elsewhere.'29
The 1991 Tender Offer Release proposed detailed exemptive rules
and registration procedures designed to facilitate the inclusion of U.S.
investors.130 The SEC aimed to establish uniform jurisdictional regula-
tion of offers for target securities with less than ten percent U.S.
holders. The proposal contained exemptions from virtually all the pro-
cedural and disclosure requirements, including the filing and
dissemination requirements, and the rules concerning proration, mini-
mum offering period, and withdrawal rights, if the offer met certain
minimal requirements."' Furthermore, the proposal contained an ex-
emption from Securities Act registration for certain exchange offers. As
the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act would continue to apply
to exempted transactions, the 1991 Tender Offer Release did not address
the perceived risk of U.S. litigation, which deters offers by foreign bid-
ders.'
2
III. THE CROSS-BORDER RULES
A. The Tier I Exemption
Tier I exempts tender offers for the securities of foreign private
issuers from Rules 13e-3, 13e-4, Regulation 14D, or Rules 14e-1 and
14e-2 when U.S. securities holders hold ten percent or less of the
foreign company's securities that are subject to the tender offer."' The
Exchange Act provisions relate to "disclosure, filing, dissemination,
minimum offering period, withdrawal rights and proration
requirements."'' 4 The offers that fall under this exemption remain
subject to the applicable rules of the target's home jurisdiction, which
includes both the entity's home and main trading market for its
129. Id.
130. International Tender and Exchange Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6897, Ex-
change Act Release No. 29,275, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2266, International Series
Release No. 285, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,803 (June 5, 1991).
131. Concept Release, supra note 10, at 23,753-54.
132. See id.
133. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,541; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e), 78n(d)
(1994); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3, e-4, 14d-I to 14d-10, 14e-l, and 14e-2 (2000).
134. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,541.
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securities. U.S. securities holders participate in the offer with terms at
least as favorable as those offered to other holders, including price, type
of consideration, and choice among various alternatives offered by the
bidder, with certain exceptions for exchange offers. Even if non-U.S.
security holders are offered consideration consisting at least partly of
securities, U.S. holders may be offered only cash, but the bidder must
have a reasonable basis to believe that the cash is substantially
equivalent to the value of the securities and any cash or other
consideration offered to non-U.S. holders.'35 However, a bidder may
continue to offer a "loan note" installment payment alternative to U.K.
security holders only; this allows taxpayers to defer the recognition of
income and capital gains on the sale of securities (a benefit unavailable
to U.S. holders).'36 Both U.S. and foreign bidders are exempted under
Tier I, and the bidder's domicile or reporting status is not determinative.
The Commission considered extending this exemption to a higher
eligibility percentage, but declined in favor of creating a separate type
of exemptive relief, Tier II. The Commission set Tier I and Securities
Act registration exemption limits on U.S. ownership at the same per-
centage to level the playing field for stock and cash tender offers. Once
a bidder commences a tender offer or business combination for securi-
ties of the same class that is the subject of the tender offer, a subsequent
bidder is eligible to use the same exemption (Tier I, Tier II, or Rule 802)
as the initial offeror, as long as it also satisfies all the exemption condi-
tions other than the U.S. ownership limitations. This provision protects
the availability of this exemption for competing bidders from any
movement of securities into the United States in response to the initial
offer.
For securities subject to Rule 13e-4 or Regulation 14D under the
Exchange Act, bidders submit, rather than file, an English language
translation of the offering materials to the SEC under cover of Form
CB, and foreign bidders must also file a consent to service on Form F-
X. The person submitting the materials would therefore not be subject to
the express liability provisions of Section 18 of the Exchange Act. A
bidder must provide its offering information, such as the tender offer
circular, to U.S. security holders in English and on a basis comparable
135. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(h)(8)(ii)(C), 14d-l(c)(2)(iii) (2000). The bidder's deter-
mination that the consideration is substantially equivalent to that offered non-U.S. holders
should be made at the commencement of the offer, and need only be adjusted if the bidder no
longer has a reasonable basis to believe the values are substantially equivalent. Cross-Border
Release, supra note 1, at 82,543 n.26.
136. "Loan notes ... are short-term notes that may be redeemed in whole or in part for
cash at par on any interest date in the future." Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,544.
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to other security holders. If the foreign subject company's' 37 home juris-
diction'38 permits dissemination solely by publication, the offeror must
simultaneously publish the offering materials in the United States in a
manner reasonably calculated to inform U.S. investors and may in addi-
tion mail the materials directly to U.S. holders. 3 9
Rule 13e-3 mandates the filing of a Schedule 13E-3, which requires
disclosure about the fairness of the transaction to unaffiliated securities
holders regarding the loss of a security's public trading market. Since it
would be impractical to impose the procedural, disclosure, and filing
requirements of Rule 13e-3 in the absence of other U.S. requirements,
Tier I transactions are exempt. The home jurisdiction determines the
basic disclosure and dissemination requirements for the offer. In cases
of predominantly foreign transactions, where Rule 13e-3 compliance
has been difficult, Commission staff has permitted modified disclosure
focusing on how the board determined its offering price, rather than re-
quiring a fairness determination.
If the transaction is exempt from registration under the Securities
Act pursuant to Tier I, the offeror may exclude target company security
holders residing in any state that does not provide an exemption from
"blue sky" law. Furthermore, if the offeror registers securities under the
Securities Act, the offeror may exclude target company security holders
residing in any state that refuses to register or qualify the offer and sale
of securities in that state after a good faith effort by the offeror. In either
event, however, the offeror must offer the securities holders cash con-
sideration instead of excluding them if it has offered cash consideration
to securities holders in another state or in a jurisdiction outside the
United States.
The beneficial ownership reporting requirements of Sections 13(d),
13(f), and 13(g) of the Exchange Act remain in effect for Tier I transac-
tions, as the Commission has determined that the need for disclosure of
ownership and control of both domestic and foreign reporting compa-
nies outweighs any burdens related to filing reports under these rules.'40
137. "Foreign subject company means any foreign private issuer whose securities are
the subject of the exchange offer or business combination." Id. at 82,564.
138. "Home jurisdiction means both the jurisdiction of the foreign subject company's
(or, in the case of a rights offering, the foreign private issuer's) incorporation, organization
or chartering and the principal foreign market where the foreign private company's (or in the
case of a rights offering, the issuer's) securities are listed or quoted." Id.
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (2000).
140. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,544.
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B. The Tier IH Exemption
Tier II exempts tender offers from limited provisions of the Ex-
change Act and the tender offer rules when U.S. security holders hold
more than ten percent, but not more than forty percent, of a foreign pri-
vate issuer's securities that are targets of the offer.'4' The Commission
intends Tier II to offer relief from a number of common impediments
that bidders face when considering whether to extend offers in the
United States. As with the Tier I exemption, domicile or reporting status
of the bidder is not relevant, as this exemption is available to both U.S.
and foreign bidders. Due to Tier II's limited scope, it is unnecessary to
pass judgment on the tender offer rules and practices of another juris-
diction.
If an offeror "relies on the Tier II exemption to make a tender offer,
a subsequent competing bidder [is] not ... subject to the 40 percent
ownership limitation condition .... ""' A tender offer "commences once
the bidder disseminates transmittal forms or discloses instructions on
how to tender into an offer,"'43 whereupon the bidder is required to file
Schedule TO in place of Forms CB or F-X. Bidders relying on the Tier
II exemption will satisfy the Regulation M-A requirements regarding
"subsequent offering periods" if the bidder pays for tendered securities
and makes the announcement in accordance with the law or practice of
the bidder's home jurisdiction. The subsequent offering period will
commence immediately after the announcement.'44
In no case will the Commission waive the application of the anti-
fraud and anti-manipulation provisions, including Section 14(e), which
prohibits a person from making a material untrue statement or material
omission or from engaging in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
acts in connection with any tender offer.' 4' Therefore, even if an offeror
could gain exemption from the Rule 14e-l (b) requirement to provide ten
days' notice if the offeror increases or decreases the consideration of-
fered under Tier II, the anti-fraud provision may still require notice of
material changes to the offer. The bidder will continue to be subject to
keeping an offer open for at least twenty business days, making an SEC
filing, disseminating offering material, and providing withdrawal rights.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (2000); Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,554 n.35.
144. 17 C.F.R. § 14d-l(d)(2)(v) (2000); Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,545.
Regulation M-A requires bidders that include a subsequent offering period to promptly pay
for tendered securities and directs them to announce the approximate number and percentage
of outstanding securities that were deposited by the close of the initial offering period.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1994).
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The "all holders" rule requires that a bidder open the tender offer to
all security holders of the class,4 6 while the "best price" rule requires
that the consideration paid to any security holder be as high as the con-
sideration paid to any other security holder. 47 The Commission offers
exemptive relief by allowing a bidder to split its offer into two separate
offers, whereby the U.S. offer would comply with the U.S. regulatory
system and the foreign offer would comply with its home jurisdiction's
rules. The offer to U.S. holders must be made on terms at least as favor-
able as those offered any other holder of the same class of securities
subject to the offer. 48
The Tier II exemption does not provide any relief from the duration
and extension requirements of the U.S. tender offer rules, which provide
that all tender offers must remain open for a minimum of twenty busi-
ness days, subject to mandatory extensions for changes in the terms of
the offer. 49 The Commission anticipates no conflict with foreign juris-
dictions to allow a bidder to keep an offer open or to extend the offer for
a longer period. Under U.S. tender offer rules, a bidder who wishes to
extend its offer beyond a scheduled expiration date must publish a no-
tice of its extension by the start of the following business day.'5° Tier II
would allow bidders to comply with their home jurisdiction's law or
practice.'
After its offer expires, current U.S. tender offer rules require an of-
feror to pay for or return tendered securities. Payment standards vary
between jurisdictions; under the T+3 settlement requirements, the nor-
mal settlement period in the United States is three days, while in the
United Kingdom bidders must normally pay within fourteen calendar
days. "'52 Tier II would allow the bidder's home requirements to apply.'53
U.S. tender offer rules require that a bidder's offer remain open for
five days following the waiver of the minimum tender condition, pro-
viding investors with a reasonable opportunity to respond to this
146. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2000) (e.g., a bidder may not limit its tender offer to in-
stitutional shareholders or target management).
147. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-10(a)(2) (2000).
148. 17 C.F.R. §§240.13e-4(i)(2)(i), 13e-4(i)(2)(ii), 14d-l(d)(2)(i), 14d-l(d)(2)(ii)
(2000); see, e.g., In the matter of Incentive AB and Gambro AB, Exchange Act Release No.
36793 (Jan. 31, 1996).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a), (b) (2000).
150. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(d) (2000).
151. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(i)(2)(iii), 14d-l(d)(2)(iii) (2000); Cross-Border Release,
supra note 1, at 82,545 n.39.
152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1(a) (2000); CITY CODE, supra note 119, Rule 31.8, at M6.
153. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(i)(2)(iv), 14d-l(d)(2)(iv) (2000); Cross-Border Release,
supra note 1, at 82,545 n.40.
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material change. '54 While some might choose to withdraw their securi-
ties in response to a lower minimum condition, others may opt to tender.
Under the U.K. City Code, a bidder that lowers the minimum condition
for its offer must then keep the offer open for fourteen days, known as a
"Subsequent Offering Period."' 55 Bidders anticipate that sufficient ten-
ders will come in during the Subsequent Offering Period to reach the
ninety percent threshold required for a compulsory acquisition. The
Commission permits a bidder in a tender offer to reserve the right to
reduce the ninety percent condition by press release and advertisement
in a U.S. newspaper five days before the reduction goes into effect. Bid-
ders may, unless Rule 14e-1 requires an extension, reduce or waive the
minimum acceptance condition without also extending withdrawal
rights for the remaining duration of the offer under Tier II if a number
of conditions are met:
[1] The bidder must announce that it may reduce the minimum
condition five business days prior to the time that it reduces
the condition. A statement at the commencement of the of-
fer ... is insufficient;
[2] The bidder must disseminate this announcement through a
press release and other methods reasonably designed to in-
form U.S. security holders, which could include placing an
advertisement in a newspaper of national circulation in the
United States;
[3] The press release must state the exact percentage to which
the acceptance condition may be reduced and state that a
reduction is possible. The bidder must declare its actual in-
tentions once it is required to do so under the regulations of
its home jurisdiction;
[4] During this five-day period, security holders who have ten-
dered their shares in the offer will have withdrawal rights;
[5] This announcement must contain language advising security
holders to withdraw their tenders immediately if their will-
ingness to tender into the offer would be affected by a
reduction of the minimum acceptance condition;
[6] The procedure for reducing the minimum condition must be
described in the offering document; and
154. Interpretive Release Relating to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
24,296, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,458 (Apr. 3, 1987).
155. CITY CODE, supra note 119, Rule 32.1, at M8-M9.
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[7] The bidder must hold the offer open for acceptances for at
least five business days after the revision or waiver of the
minimum acceptance condition.'
56
C. Other Tender Offer Rules
Rule 14e-5 (former Rule 1Ob-13), which prohibits a bidder in a ten-
der or exchange offer from purchasing the targeted security outside the
offer, will now contain an exception for Tier I tender or exchange offers
where less than ten percent of the subject securities are held by U.S.
securities holders. U.S. security holders would otherwise be disadvan-
taged in certain situations, as bidders might decide to exclude U.S.
security holders from the offer when Rule lOb-13 would preclude pur-
chases outside the offer and the participation of U.S. security holders is
not critical to the success of the offer. Purchases outside the tender or
exchange offer that comply with the tender offer regulations of the
home jurisdiction will be permitted in a Tier Itender offer, as long as
the U.S. offering documentation prominently discloses the possibility of
such purchases and the manner in which any information about such
purchases will be disclosed and the bidder discloses to U.S. security
holders information regarding the purchases in a manner comparable to
disclosure made in the home jurisdiction.157
The Commission will not extend this exception to Tier II offers, be-
cause of their greater U.S. interest, but it will review requests for relief
on a case-by-case basis. 58 In making such a review, the Commission
will consider several factors:
[1] proportional ownership of U.S. security holders of the
[target] security in relation to the total number of shares
outstanding and to the public float;
[2] whether the offer will be for "any-and-all" shares or will in-
volve prorationing;
[3] whether the offered consideration will be cash or securities;
[4] whether the offer will be subject to a foreign jurisdiction's
laws, rules, or principles governing the conduct of tender
156. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,545.
157. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(i) (2000). See generally Paul, Weiss, Rifind, Wharton
& Garrison, SEC Proposes New Rules for Cross-Border Tender Offers, Exchange Offers,
Business Combination and Rights Offerings, Mondaq Business Briefing (Nov. 27, 1998)
available at http://www.mondaq.com.
158. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,547.
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offers that provide protections comparable to Rule [10b-
13]; and
[5] whether the principle trading market for the target security
is outside the United States.'59
The Cross-Border Rules codify the class exception from Rule lOb-
13 previously granted to "connected exempt market makers" and
"connected exempt principal traders," as defined by the U.K. City
Code.' 60 The exemption applies to purchases or arrangements to pur-
chase if they are "effected by a connected exempt market maker or a
connected exempt principal trader"; "the issuer of the [target] security is
a foreign private issuer"; "the tender offer is subject to the City Code";
and "the tender offer documents disclose the identity of the ... market
maker or... principal trader and.., describe how U.S. security holders
can obtain information regarding ... purchases by such market maker
or principal trader" outside the offer. 6' The SEC believes U.K. regula-
tory requirements and oversight are sufficient to minimize the risk
posed by connected exempt market makers and connected exempt prin-
cipal traders to U.S. security holders. Forcing such eligible traders to
withdraw from trading in U.K. target securities would have threatened
the liquidity of those securities.'
62
D. Exemptions from the Securities Act for Exchange Offers,
Business Combinations, and Rights Offerings
The Cross-Border Rules also contain "exemptions from Securities
Act registration requirements for securities issued to U.S. security hold-
ers of a foreign private issuer in exchange offer, business combinations,
and rights offerings."' 63 Rule 800 provides common definitions for both
rules. Offerors may rely on these exemptions when U.S. securities hold-
ers hold of record ten percent or less of the subject class of securities, as
U.S. participation is generally not necessary for the success of an offer-
ing below this level and offerors commonly exclude U.S. security
holders.' 64 Offerors made seventy-eight rights offerings to U.S. share-
159. Id.
160. "[C]onnected exempt market makers and connected exempt principal traders are
market makers or principal traders that are affiliated with the bidder's advisors (Eligible
Traders)." Id. n.47.
161. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,547.
162. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,547 n.48.
163. Id. at 82,548.
164. The Commission notes that U.S. holders are included in a significant number of
transactions where U.S. ownership exceeds 10 percent (31 of 54 requests for exemptive
relief between 1990 and 1998). Id. n.53.
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holders holding American or Global depositary receipts held by the
Bank of New York between 1994 and 1998, but excluded U.S. share-
holders entirely in thirty of the offerings (39%). The Bank of New York
sold the rights and provided shareholders with cash, after costs, in the
remaining forty-eight (61%).165
Securities Act exemptive Rule 801 exempts securities issued in
certain rights offerings by foreign private issuers'66 and is only available
for rights offerings of equity securities16 made on a pro rata basis to ex-
isting security holders of the same class, including holders of ADRs.
Foreign companies typically make rights offerings only with respect to
outstanding equity securities of the same class and Rule 801 is similarly
limited to the offer of securities of the same class as those held by offer-
ees. The rights granted to U.S. security holders must not be transferable
except offshore in accordance with Regulation S.168
Securities Act exemptive Rule 802 exempts securities issued in ex-
change offers by U.S. or foreign offerors for foreign private issuers'
securities. Securities issued in certain business combinations involving
foreign private issuers may also be exempt. If a second bidder com-
mences a tender offer or a business combination during an ongoing
offer or combination subject to Rule 802 for the same class of securities,
the second bidder may also use Rule 802 if all the conditions other than
the limitation of U.S. ownership are satisfied.
The securities acquired in a Rule 801 or 802 transaction will have
the same restricted characteristics as the securities originally subject to
the rule, i.e., restricted securities under Rule 144 held by a U.S. investor
will yield restricted securities, and unrestricted securities will yield
165. Letter from Peter B. Tisne, Emmet, Marvin & Marvin, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec-
retary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 17, 1999) at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s72998/tisnel.txt. Costs include transaction fees, ADR cash distribution or
issuance fees, and potential liquidity costs if the foreign market is small. Cross-Border Re-
lease, supra note 1, at 82,548 n.54.
166. Id. at 82,549-50.
167. Equity security means the same as in § 240.3a 1-1 ... but for purposes of this
section only does not include:
(1) Any debt security that is convertible into an equity security, with or with-
out consideration;
(2) Any debt security that includes a warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase an equity security;
(3) Any such warrant or right; or
(4) Any put, call, straddle, or other option or privilege that gives the holder
the option of buying or selling a security but does not require the holder
to do so.
Id. at 82,564.
168. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-905 (2000).
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unrestricted securities." 9 Unrestricted securities are freely tradable by
non-affiliate security holders, as long as they do not participate in the
offer under circumstances under which they could be deemed statutory
underwriters. Neither Rule 801 nor 802 imposes a dollar limitation on
the value of securities sold to U.S. investors in an exempt transaction.'"
The rules do not impose specific informational requirements; rather,
"when any document, notice or other information is provided to
offerees, copies (translated into English) must be provided to U.S.
security holders in a similar manner," must contain a "legend regarding
the foreign nature of the transaction and the issuer's disclosure
practices," and must "state that investors may have difficulty in
enforcing rights against the issuer and its officers and directors.",' 7' The
offeror must provide the notice or offering document to U.S. security
holders at the same time it provides the information to offshore offerees.
An offeror must submit a notification to the Commission on Form CB
and a foreign company must simultaneously file a Form F-X to appoint
an agent for service of process in the United States.
Both Rules 801 and 802 are available for securities issued by
closed-end investment companies that are registered under the Invest-
ment Company Act,'72 which the Commission views as consistent with
its previous decision to permit closed-end investment companies to rely
on the Regulation S safe harbor to issue unregistered securities
abroad. "'
E. Internet Disclosure
An offeror conducting a tender or exchange offer may post materi-
als on a Web site, as long as the offeror prominently discloses that the
offer is made to persons in countries other than the United States and
implements precautionary measures that are reasonably designed to
guard against sales to persons in the United States or to U.S. persons in
an offshore Internet offer.'74 The SEC foresees particular danger with the
169. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.800-802, General Notes, n.8 (2000).
170. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,550.
171. Id.
172. The proposed rules would not have allowed securities issued by investment com-
panies to gain exemption because the Investment Company act generally prohibits foreign
investment companies from publicly offering their securities in the U.S. or to U.S. persons,
and domestic investment companies generally must register the securities they offer or sell
outside the United States. Proposing Release, supra note 5, at 69151 n.126 (Dec. 15, 1998).
173. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,551 n.67; see Offshore Offers and Sales,
Securities Act Release No. 6863, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,320-21 (Apr. 24, 1990).
174. See Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer
Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 7516, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,806 (March 27, 1998).
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use of Web sites to publish materials relating to tender and exchange
offers and rights offerings by offerors, subject companies, or third par-
ties, as U.S. holders will have a greater incentive to find indirect means
to participate in the offer.'75 The Cross-Border Release advises offerors
to prevent sales to U.S. holders by determining whether holders are per-
sons in the United States or U.S. persons and to avoid material in a Web
site designed to induce U.S. investors to find an indirect means to par-
ticipate in the offer, e.g., through offshore nominees.7 6 If a simultaneous
private offering in the United States accompanies an offshore Internet
offering, the offeror must take particular care to prevent the use of the
Internet offering as a general solicitation to find qualified private in-
vestors. An offeror conducting an offshore exchange offer or rights
offering on the Internet must institute means to provide reasonable as-
surance that its Web site will not be used to solicit U.S. investors for the
private U.S. offering. 7
F. U.S. Security Holder Status
Relief under both Tier I and II exemptions and the availability of
the Rules 801 and 802 Securities Act exemptions for cross-border rights
offerings and exchange offers depend on the percentage of the target
company's securities held by U.S. holders not exceeding a certain
threshold.' A company claiming "foreign private issuer" status must
175. See Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,556.
176. Id.
177. These measures include:
not placing U.S. investors that respond to the offshore Internet offering in
the U.S. private offering;
extending the U.S. offer only to U.S. investors who were solicited before,
or independently from, the posting of offering materials on the Internet;
using separate contact persons for the Internet solicitation from that for
the U.S. offering; and
not referring to the private U.S. offering in the Web site materials, except
to the extent mandated by foreign law.
Id. at 82,556-57.
178. To determine the percentage of outstanding securities held by U.S. holders:
(1) Calculate percentage of outstanding securities held by U.S. holders as of
the record date for a rights offering, or 30 days before the commencement
of an exchange offer or the solicitation for a business combination.
(2) Include securities underlying American Depositary Shares convertible or
exchangeable into the securities that are the subject of the tender offer
when calculating the number of subject securities outstanding, as well as
the number held by U.S. holders. Exclude from the calculations other
types of securities that are convertible or exchangeable into the securities
that are the subject of the tender offer, such as warrants, options and con-
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now look through certain bank, broker-dealer, and other nominees to
determine the residence of the nominee's client accounts. 7 9 The stan-
dard for determining the amount of securities held by U.S. holders is a
modification of Rule 12g3-2(a) of the Exchange Act.' The Commission
requires issuers to "'look through' the record ownership of broker,
dealers, banks, or nominees appearing on the issuer's books or those of
the transfer agents, depositaries, or others acting on the issuer's behalf,"
but only to the extent the securities are "held of record (1) in the United
States, (2) in the issuer's home jurisdiction, and (3) in the primary trad-
ing market for the issuer's securities if different from the issuer's home
jurisdiction."'"' This standard requires issuers to ask nominees to pro-
vide the aggregate amount of the nominee's holdings that are
represented by U.S. accounts, rather than the number of U.S. holders or
their names.'8 2 If an issuer is unable to obtain information about a nomi-
nee's customer accounts after "reasonable inquiry," the issuer may "rely
on a presumption that the customer accounts are held in the nominee's
principal place of business.' 83
vertible securities. Exclude from those calculations securities held by per-
sons who hold more than 10 percent of the subject securities, or that are
held by the offeror in an exchange offer or business combination;
(3) Use the method of calculating record ownership in Rule 12g3-2(a) under
the Exchange Act (§ 240.12g3-2(a) of this chapter), except that your in-
quiry as to the amount of securities represented by accounts of customers
resident in the United States may be limited to brokers, dealers, banks and
other nominees located in the United States, the subject company's juris-
diction of incorporation or that of each participant in a business
combination, and the jurisdiction that is the primary trading market for
the subject securities, if different from the subject company's jurisdiction
of incorporation;
(4) If, after reasonable inquiry, you are unable to obtain information about
the amount of securities represented by accounts of customers resident in
the United States, you may assume, for purposes of this provision, that
the customers are residents of the jurisdiction in which the nominee has
its principal place of business.
(5) Count securities as owned by U.S. holders when publicly filed reports of
beneficial ownership or information that is otherwise provided to you in-
dicates that the securities are held by U.S. residents.
Id. at 82,564-65.
179. International Disclosure Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 41,936, 64 Fed.
Reg. 53,900 (Oct. 5, 1999).
180. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a) (2000) (based on Rule 12g5-1 defining "securities held
of record").





The percentage of U.S. holders is determined at the commence-
ment ' of a tender offer, rights offering, or exchange offer. For a
business combination such as a merger, where the acquiring company
issues securities, the calculation is based on U.S. ownership of the target
company at the commencement of the solicitation of the merger.' 5 For a
combination such as an amalgamation, where a successor company is-
sues the securities to all participating companies, the calculation is made
as if immediately following completion of the combination. All partici-
pants in an amalgamation must be foreign private issuers.18
6
As it is difficult for third-party offerors to determine eligibility for
an exemption without information on the foreign subject company's87
U.S. ownership, 8' a third-party bidder in an unsolicited or "hostile" ten-
der offer may rely upon a presumption that the Tier I, Tier II, and Rule
802 U.S. ownership percentage limitations are not exceeded unless:
(1) the aggregate trading volume of the subject class of securi-
ties on all national securities exchanges in the United States,
on the NASDAQ market or on the OTC market, as reported
to the NASD, over the 12-calendar-month period ending 30
days before commencement of the offer, exceeds ten per-
cent in the case of Tier I offers and Rule 802, and 40
percent in the case of Tier II offers, of the worldwide ag-
gregate trading volume of that class of securities over the
same period;
(2) the most recent annual report or other informational form
filed or submitted by the issuer or security holders to secu-
rities regulators in its home jurisdiction or elsewhere
(including with the Commission) indicates that U.S. hold-
ings exceed the applicable threshold; or
184. The term "commencement" means the same as in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(a)
(2000).
185. Large U.S. holders are excluded from the calculation of U.S. ownership, as they
do not need the protections of the securities laws and may easily go abroad to participate in
the transaction or participate on a private transaction basis. See Cross-Border Release, supra
note 1, at 82,553-54.
186. Cross-Border Release, supra note l,at 82,553.
187. The bidder may presume the foreign subject company is a foreign private issuer if
the subject "files reports with the Commission under the foreign integrated disclosure system
or has claimed an exemption from reporting under Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b), unless the
bidder knows the ... company is not a foreign private issuer." Cross-Border Release, supra
note 1, at 82,554.
188. This is not a concern if the offer follows a competing tender offer or business
combination eligible for the exemption, since a second bidder may rely on the first bidder's
exemption as long as all the other conditions are satisfied. Id. n.79.
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(3) the bidder knows or has reason to know from other sources
that the level of U.S. ownership of the subject class exceeds
the thresholds. 89
IV. A NORMATIVE LOOK AT THE U.S. REGULATION
OF CROSS-BORDER OFFERS
A. The Cross-Border Rules Within the
Regulatory Competition Paradigm
Regulators must strike a delicate balance when formulating rules
governing tender offers to maintain the liquidity of U.S. markets. They
face a Hobson's Choice: weak regulation increases the risk, and strong
regulation the cost, of investing, so that in either case high-quality com-
panies and investors will shift their capital towards safer, or cheaper,
markets to the extent possible.' 90 Internationalization may create an en-
vironment of regulatory competition among nations, though it need not
be a "race to the bottom."' 9' Investors will likely bargain around the
rules' 92 by discounting the price of securities in markets they believe
pose greater risks of fraud, manipulation, unfairness, or general uncer-
tainty regarding the trustworthiness of financial information.' 93 An
alternative policy of harmonization could be a more efficient way to
reduce the costs and risks of international finance. The SEC would defer
to the standards of another jurisdiction (reciprocity) or would work with
regulators in other jurisdictions to produce a substantially uniform stan-
dard (commonality).'94 Some question whether investors would be able
to deal with multiple standards in a single market and whether recogni-
tion of foreign-based standards would raise serious administrative and
enforcement issues, potentially weakening the SEC's political force.' 95
Many scholars advocate the availability of multiple standards for
disclosure in the United States. Professors Merritt Fox and Roberta
189. Id. at 82,554. The presumption does not apply to offers "made pursuant to an
agreement" with the issuer. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.802(c)(1) (2000); 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-l(c)-(d),
Instruction 3(i) (2000); Cross-Border Release, supra note I, at 82,554 n.80.
190. Joel Seligman, Another Unspecial Study: The SEC's Market 2000 Report and
Competitive Developments in the United States Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 485, 495
(1995).
191. Cox, supra note 18, at 1201; cf Cary, supra note 20.
192. See generally, RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET & THE LAW (1988).
193. See Cox, supra note 18, at 1200, 1221 (arguing that investors might accept a lower
return for owning shares with financial statements reconciled to U.S. GAAP than if less
information were disclosed).
194. See Geiger, supra note 16, at 271.
195. Cox, supra note 18, at 1229.
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Romano argue for the state or nation of the issuer's domicile to deter-
mine disclosure standards.'9 6 On one end of the spectrum, Professors
Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman set forth a radical system of
"portable reciprocity," whereby issuers may select any regulatory sys-
tem's disclosure requirements.' On the other, Professor Paul Mahoney
believes that the exchange that lists a security should regulate the is-
suer's disclosure. This note will consider to what extent the debate
regarding multiple disclosure standards is relevant to the regulation of
cross-border tender offers.
B. Commentary on the Cross-Border Rules
When the Cross-Border Rules were in their proposal stage, the SEC
sought public comment on procedural and substantive elements. Com-
mentators generally supported the implementation of the exemptive
relief provided by the Rules, but proposed a number of refinements,
many of which were reflected in the final Rules. Professor Roberta
Karmel described the Rules in their proposal form as
reluctant and incremental .... Although the SEC claims a pre-
eminent role in raising global disclosure standards, it appears to
be far more interested in preserving its jurisdiction over U.S. is-
suers and markets than in fostering globalization or recognizing
any merit in foreign regulatory systems. Instead of attempting to
harmonize its regulations with foreign regulations, or engaging
in the line drawing that selective mutual recognition would en-
tail, the SEC simply creates exemptions from its regulations
when confronted with the reality that its efforts to protect in-
vestors are contrary to their interests and desires.'98
Goldman, Sachs noted that it often experiences the reluctance of
bidders to subject cross-border tender offers to U.S. regulation and be-
lieves that the adoption of the exemptive relief would encourage non-
U.S. companies to arrange for participation in more cross-border trans-
actions.'99 Of lingering concern, however, was the liability that
custodians and intermediaries face in their dealings with foreign private
issuers in cross-border transactions. Goldman, Sachs believes that the
196. See Fox, supra note 14, at 2582; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Mar-
ket Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2408-10 (1998).
197. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the In-
ternational Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).
198. Karmel, supra note 25, at 3.
199. Letter from Michael L. Crowl et al., Goldman, Sachs & Co., to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s72998/goldman1 .htm (Feb. 25, 1999)[hereinafter Goldman, Sachs Letter].
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SEC should raise the U.S. ownership ceiling for tender offers to twenty
percent, in line with the percentage of U.S. ownership of an issuer's
debt securities that qualifies as "substantial U.S. market interest" un-
der Regulation S.'2° The bank supports the SEC's exclusion of U.S.
holders of more than ten percent of the subject class of securities from
the calculation of the percentage of the class held by U.S. holders, since
such holders are likely sufficiently sophisticated and familiar with the
issuer not to require protection from the U.S. securities laws. Ragen,
MacKenzie similarly supports the exclusion of large holders such as
mutual funds from the calculation. If the combined total of retail and
institutional holders exceeds the threshold, the institutions will be able
to participate through their offshore offices, while retail investors will
continue to be excluded. °' Goldman, Sachs believes that the Commis-
sion should additionally exempt transactions where the number of U.S.
holders is small (e.g., no more than 300), regardless of the percentage of
shares held by U.S. holders. A special ABA committee advocated rais-
ing the threshold for the Tier I, Rule 801, and Rule 802 exemptions to
fifteen percent, but without excluding large non-U.S. holders from the
calculation of ownership by U.S. persons.0 2
The SEC notes in the Cross-Border Release that the omission of the
information called for by U.S. forms in the context of foreign disclosure
requirements and practices would not necessarily violate U.S. disclosure
requirements. The Commission or investors could bring an anti-fraud
action "if the omitted information is material in the context of the trans-
action and the disclosure provided is misleading as a result of the
omission ..... ,203 Goldman, Sachs supports the continued application of
the general anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act to cross-border
offers but believes that the SEC should clarify that neither a Rule 801
rights offering nor a Rule 802 exchange offer would be a "public offer-
ing" per § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act 2° and that neither would subject
an issuer to potential liability or enforcement proceedings under
§ 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act.05 The ABA committee encouraged the
Commission to note that U.S. courts, in considering the extraterritorial
200. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(j) (2000).
201. See Ragen MacKenzie Letter, supra note 6.
202. Letter from John M. Liftin et al., Chairman of the Committee on Federal Regula-
tion of Securities of the American Bar Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72998/
liftinl.htm (Mar. 2, 1999) [hereinafter ABA Letter].
203. Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,540.
204. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
205. See Goldman, Sachs Letter, supra note 198.
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application of U.S. securities laws, have been mindful of principles of
comity.2°
In response to concern that foreign offerors would continue to ex-
clude U.S. holders absent a cash-only alternative in Tier I offers, 27 the
SEC amended the Cross-Border Rules to allow such offers without vio-
lating the equal treatment requirements."8 This condition is satisfied if
the bidder has a reasonable basis to believe that the cash is substantially
equivalent to the value of the securities and any cash or other consid-
eration offered to non-U.S. holders. The ABA objected to the SEC's
requirement of a valuation opinion, arguing that the need to obtain for-
mal legal and financial opinions about the equivalence of the amount of
consideration is likely to be prohibitively expensive.0 9 The SEC dis-
missed this objection, arguing that an issuer "seeking to use this
exemption to avoid issuing securities to U.S. holders would not find the
valuation requirement excessively burdensome" and that the opinion
"would provide reasonable reassurance that U.S. security holders
[would] receiv[e] equivalent value to that offered to non-U.S. hold-
ers.
'21 °
Based on transactions filed with the Commission, relatively few of-
fers for the securities of foreign issuers will be ineligible for the Tier I
exemption. The Commission therefore considered omitting the Tier II
exemption entirely in favor of case-by-case relief, but commentators
supported its inclusion in the Cross-Border Rules.2 1' The ABA cited the
value of a clear standard that is known in advance and permits easy
identification of offers that may need additional no-action or exemptive
relief.212 Based on the similarity of U.S. and U.K. disclosure standards,
Goldman, Sachs believes the SEC should allow a U.K. tender offer un-
der the City Code to proceed under Tier II on the basis of U.K.
disclosure documents.2 3
The SEC adopted exemptions to new Rule 14e-5 for Tier I offers to
permit "connected exempt market makers" and "connected exempt
principal traders," as defined by the City Code, to continue their U.K.
market making activities during cross-border offers that are subject to
the City Code. The exemption for transactions subject to the City Code
demonstrates the SEC's willingness to recognize the substantial
206. ABA Letter, supra note 201.
207. Id.
208. See Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,543.
209. ABA Letter, supra note 201.
210. See Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,543.
211. See Cross-Border Release, supra note 1, at 82,547.
212. ABA Letter, supra note 201.
213. Goldman, Sachs Letter, supra note 1.
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protection to investors provided by regulatory oversight in the United
Kingdom2 4 and was enthusiastically supported by commentators.
2 5
Goldman, Sachs argued that the application of Rule 14e-5 to U.K.
trading activities significantly disrupts normal market practice by
inhibiting an offeror's ability to make open market purchases and by
precluding market making activities by affiliates of the offeror's
financial advisor.' 6 The SEC rejected the suggestion of Goldman, Sachs
to extend this relief to all Tier II offers, however, citing the greater U.S.
interest in those offers.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TENDER OFFER REGULATORY MODEL:
THE GERMAN TAKEOVER CODE
As commercial banks are major shareholders of the most significant
German public companies, equity capital plays a much smaller (but
growing) role in Germany than in the United States.2 7 German law gives
controlling shareholders formidable discretionary powers, in contrast
with the dispersed power common in the United States.218 Share owner-
ship among German adults is estimated at only 13%.29 German bank
borrowing is more than twice that of the United States, while stock
market capitalization is four times higher in the United States than the
capitalization of all the stock exchanges of the euro area. 20 Market
capitalization in terms of gross domestic product is approximately 55%
in Germany, but well over 100% in the United States and the United
Kingdom.2 2 ' Blue chip stocks have traditionally dominated the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange; DAX companies account for 80% of trading volumes,
and Deutsche Telekom alone represents 19% of the German equity
market. 22 However, Germany experienced a retail equity revolution in
1996 with Deutsche Telekom's historic privatization, which began to
replace popular suspicion of share ownership with a shareholding cul-
214. See Cross-Border Rules, supra note 1, at 82,547.
215. Goldman, Sachs Letter, supra note 198.
216. Id.
217. See Karmel, supra note 77, at 1140.
218. See Coffee, supra note 55, at 643.
219. Frankfurt's Deutsche Borse Emerges as a Global Player, FINANCIAL NEWS, Aug.
23, 1999 (ownership is up from 9% in 1997).
220. The Case for Capital Markets, EUROPEAN BANKER, Nov. 23, 1999, at 15.
221. FINANCIAL NEWS, supra note 219.
222. Unfortunate Few Caught in the Steps of Giants: Small Countries and Fund Man-
agers Are Being Left Behind by the Super Companies Dominating European Bourses,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at 37.
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ture. 223 Equities turnover at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange increased
from C 1 trillion ($1.06 trillion) in 1996 to C 2.25 trillion in 1998.224
The most important securities laws in Germany are the Securities
Trading Act,225 the Sales Prospectus Act 226 and the Stock Exchange
Act. 227 The Federal Securities Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsant
fir den Wertpapierhandel, or BAWe) supervises all public offers of un-
listed securities only. The German stock exchanges (Wertpapierbtrsen),
most notably the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Frankfurter Wertpapier-
bbrse), regulate the public offering of listed securities. The markets are
divided into a primary segment known as the Official Market (amtlicher
Handel), a segment for smaller companies known as the Regulated
Market (geregelter Markt), and a broker-dealer segment known as the
Free Market (Freiverkehr). Each segment imposes different disclosure
requirements.2 2 8 Listed corporations must disclose or publish their an-
nual financial statements, and those listed on the Official Market must
also publish or agree to furnish on demand a report semi-annually.
These issuers must announce significant shiifts in voting rights; the
thresholds considered significant are 5, 10, 25, 50, and 75%.229 Further-
more, issuers whose securities are listed on the Official or Regulated
Markets must disclose any information that may be material to their
share prices.23°
The German Federal Ministry of Finance appoints the Exchange
Expert Commission (Blirsensachverstiindigenkommission) to advise the
government regarding capital markets and exchanges. The Exchange
Expert Commission is composed of representatives of the exchanges,
the credit sector, industry, the insurance sector, investors, the German
central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), federal states with authority over
223. See FINANCIAL NEWS, supra note 219.
224. Id.
225. Gesetz iiber den Wertpapierhandel (Securities Trading Act) (WpHG), v.
26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1749), BGBI. 1114110-14.
226. Wertpapier-Verkaufsprospektgesetz (VerkProspG) (Sales Prospectus Act) v.
17.7.1996 (BGB1. I S.1047), together with Verordnung iber Wertpapierverkaufsprospekte
(VerkProspVO) (Sales Prospectus Regulation) BGB1. 1114110-3-1..
227. Birsengesetz (BdrsG) (Stock Exchange Act) v. 17.7.1996, BGBI. III 4110-1, to-
gether with Verordung uber die Zulassung von Wertpapieren zur aintlichen Notierung an
einer Wertpapierborse (BorsZulVO) (Stock Exchange Admission Regulation) v. 17.7.1996
(BGBI. I S.1052), BGBI. III 4110-1-1. For a detailed summary of German securities regula-
tion, see Mark I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings:
Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
207, 221-24 (1999).
228. Steinberg, supra note 227, at 222.
229. Steinberg, supra note 227, at 224 (citing Securities Trading Act, supra note 225,
§ 21).
230. Id. at 224 (citing Securities Trading Act, supra note 225, § 15).
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exchanges, and academia. The Exchange Expert Commission in turn
appoints members of the Takeover Commission, which supervises
public tender offers and exercises the authority to provide binding inter-
pretations of (and grant exemptions from) the provisions of the
Takeover Code (Obernahmekodex) 2 The Takeover Commission's Ex-
ecutive Office reviews public tender offers within two weeks of
publication to determine the participants' compliance with the Takeover
Code233 and may exempt the offeror2 14 or the target company in part or in
whole from individual provisions if the application would harm the le-
gitimate interests of the offeror, the target company, or its security
holders.235
The "Guidelines for Public Voluntary Purchase and Exchange Ten-
der Offers, as well as Invitations to Issue Such Offers, for Shares or
Rights Traded on the Official Market or the Regulated Free Market"
laid the Code's foundation in the late 1970s.236 Though public tender
offers were legally possible, they were essentially unknown. The Ex-
change Expert Commission sought to formulate rules ensuring the equal
treatment of (and the provision of equal information to) the target's
shareholders and the orderly and fair execution of takeover offer pro-
ceedings. The Guidelines recommended that credit institutions facilitate
takeover proceedings, which would establish contact with shareholders
and function as clearing and exchange agents. It became clear, however,
that the Guidelines suffered from incompleteness and a lack of transpar-237
ency.2' The Exchange Expert Commission prepared the Code in 1995 to
recommend rules of conduct for parties involved in voluntary public
tender offers, to prevent market manipulation, and to ensure that princi-
ples of good faith govern all transactions.23 The Takeover Code is
231. The Takeover Commission is an independent, autonomous institution with final
decision-making authority, and consists of between seven and fifteen members, each of
whom serves a renewable five-year term. Explanatory Memorandum of the Takeover Com-
mission of July 1996 Concerning the Takeover Code, art. 20, at 15, at http://www.kodex.de
(last visited February 15, 2001) [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum].
232. Id. at 3.
233. Id. art. 22, at 16.
234. Within the meaning of the Takeover Code, an offeror is any natural or legal per-
son having its seat in Germany or abroad that, either alone or together with other persons,
makes a public tender offer. See id. at 2.
235. Id. art. 23, at 16.
236. STEPHAN SCHUSTER & CHRISTIAN ZSCHOCKE, TAKEOVER LAW 47 (Bilingual ed.
1996) (Leitsatze filr 6ffentliche freiwillige Kauf- und Umtauschangebote bzw. Aufforderun-
gen zur Abgabe derartige Angebote in amtlich notierten oder im geregelten Freiverkehr
gehandelten Aktien bzw. Erwerbsrechten).
237. Id. at 47-48.
238. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, at 1. The Takeover Code entered
into force on October 1, 1995. Id. art. 24, at 17. The Code was amended on January 1, 1998.
See Explanatory Remarks on the Amendments to the Takeover Code Effective as of January
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modeled on the "internationally recognized Anglo-Saxon model of the
City Code."23 9
The Takeover Code applies to all public tender offers that fall out-
side the purview of the German corporation law provisions regarding
minority shareholders, e.g., those concerning the conclusion of control
and profit transfer agreements.2" It primarily addresses offers for the
voting rights of the target, which are typically common shares, but also
includes ADRs and the conversion rights of convertible bonds.24' For a
tender offer to be subject to the Takeover Code, a target company must
have its registered office in Germany, and its shares must be registered
on a German exchange or over-the-counter market. Foreign target com-
panies are therefore exempt.242 The Exchange Expert Commission
requests that potential offerors, target companies, and investment serv-
ices enterprises accede to the provisions of the Takeover Code,243
assuming voluntary self-regulation provides a more flexible structure
than rigid law. The Takeover Commission may comment on offers that
fail to comply with the Code, even if the participating parties have not
submitted accession declarations." The Exchange Expert Commission
may adapt the Takeover Code to reflect developments in the capital
markets. 24 ' The Commission has developed a special accession declara-
tion for investment services enterprises, in addition to the standard
declaration. 6
The Takeover Code requires offerors to treat all holders of the same
class of security equally 7 and imposes a duty on parties in a transaction
to provide security holders of the target company with sufficient infor-
mation to make an appropriate and timely decision regarding the merits
of the offer. The target company is required to provide the same infor-
mation to any third parties demonstrating a serious interest.248 The
offeror and the target company must avoid causing market distortions
by refraining from making statements or other acts that could cause un-
usual price movements. In particular, all participants must remain silent
1, 1998, at http://www.kodex.de (last visited February 15, 2001) [hereinafter Explanatory
Remarks].
239. SCHUSTER & ZSCHOCKE, supra note 236, at 53.
240. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, at 2.
241. Id. at 2-3.
242. Id. at 2; cf Cross-Border Release, supra note 1.
243. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 21, at 16.
244. SCHUSTER & ZSCHOCKE, supra note 236, at 65.
245. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, at 1.
246. SCHUSTER & ZSCHOCKE, supra note 236, at 63.
247. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 1, at 4.
248. Id. art. 2, at 4.
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before the public announcement of a takeover offer. 9 The Takeover
Code explicitly notes a preference for "friendly" offers by recommend-
ing discussions between the offeror and the target company.50
Before making a tender offer, the offeror must notify the domestic
exchanges that list the target securities and any securities offered in ex-
change, the BAWe, and the Takeover Commission of the terms of the
tender offer and must then publish the offer in a national newspaper.5
The offeror must hire a European Union investment services enter-
prise 212 that possesses expertise in European capital markets, advises
compliance with the Takeover Code, assists the offeror in interpreting
the Takeover Code, and is able to execute its technical legal proce-
dures.253
The Takeover Code requires an offeror to disclose all facts and in-
tentions necessary for the holders of the target company's securities to
evaluate the offer. An offeror must prepare any publication directed to
249. Id. art. 3, at 5.
250. Id. art. 4, at 5-6.
251. Id. art. 5, at 6.
252. While this role was once restricted to banks, the European Union Financial Serv-
ices Directive required the Takeover Code to expand the definition to include enterprises
licensed to provide investment services. Id. art. 6, at 6.
253. Id.
254. This includes the following information:
(1) Firm name or personal name of the offeror and of any facilitating enter-
prise, pursuant to Article 6 of the Takeover Code;
(2) Firm name of the target company;
(3) The securities that are the subject of the tender offer;
(4) The highest and/or the lowest number of securities that the offeror com-
mits to purchase as well as explanations concerning the allocation
procedure pursuant to Article 10;
(5) Information regarding both the purchase price and other consideration
and the settlement of the tender offer;
(6) Information regarding the principal factors that were decisive in deter-
mining the consideration;
(7) An indication whether the tender offer will be deemed accepted upon a
declaration of acceptance by the shareholder of the target company or
whether the shareholders of the target company are merely invited to of-
fer securities of the target company to the offeror;
(8) Information regarding the number of securities of the target company
purchased by the offeror prior to the tender offer, and the time of such
purchase(s), as well as information regarding agreements to purchase
such securities that have been concluded but not yet performed;
(9) If applicable, information regarding the target company's direct and indi-
rect holdings in the offeror (if known);




holders of the target company's securities with the highest standards of
care and accuracy, which refers to the diligence of a prudent business-
man (ordenlicher Kaufinann). This requirement seeks to ensure that the
published information is comprehensive, accurate, and generally under-
standable.255
An offeror may not make its tender offer contingent on conditions
within its discretion, a circumstance that would jeopardize a fair take-
over process and a serious evaluation and valuation of the offer by the
target company and the holders of its securities. Similar to Rule 13 of
the City Code, under the Takeover Code an offeror may condition its
offer on acquiring a minimum percentage of securities of the target or
adopting the necessary resolutions for entering the offeror in the share
register for shares with registered transfer.256 If the holders tender more
securities than the offeror committed to purchase, the offeror must pur-
chase the securities on a pro rata basis according to the amount each
holder agreed to sell. An offeror can also offer to purchase a portion of
the share capital of the target, in which case the offeror is not obligated
to purchase more securities. 21' A tender offer must remain open for at
least twenty-eight, but no more than sixty calendar days, to ensure the
holders have a reasonable time to examine the terms of the offer.258
(12) Conditions of the tender offer, if any, and reservation by the offeror of the
right to withdraw the tender offer, if any;
(13) Information regarding the objectives and intentions which the offeror
seeks to accomplish through the tender offer with respect to the target
company, as well as the possible consequences of a successful tender of-
fer, in particular with respect to the financial position of the offeror and
the target company;
(14) An indication that the holders of securities of the target company can
withdraw their declaration of acceptance of the tender offer pursuant to
the terms of Article 14;
(15) An indication of [when] the results of the tender offer will be made pub-
lic;
(16) Information regarding the status of antitrust clearance procedures, if ap-
plicable;
(17) Reference to any exemption from provisions of [the Takeover] Code
which may have been granted by the Takeover Commission; [and]
(18) the commitment of the offeror to comply with the provisions of [the
Takeover] Code.
Id. art. 7, at 6-7.
255. Id. art. 8, at 8.
256. Id. art. 9, at 8. An issuer should consult the Executive Office regarding specific
conditions. Id.
257. Id. art. 10, at 8-9. The tender offer must explain the allocation procedure. Id.
258. Id. art. 11, at 9.
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If an offeror, or someone on the offeror's behalf, engages in any
transactions5 9 involving the target company's securities after it pub-
lishes its tender offer, the offeror must notify the Executive Office no
later than the next business day and must announce the transactions
publicly. This requirement originates with any prior public notice of
such an offer.2' An offeror may purchase target company securities
from third parties during the offer period outside the scope of the tender
offer but must offer more favorable conditions to all holders of securi-
ties of the same class, including those who have already tendered their
securities. More favorable conditions include advantages such as un-
conditional or unlimited purchases of securities when the public tender
offer is subject to conditions or a limited quota, in addition to a higher
261price. If an offeror improves the terms of its offer during the offer pe-
riod (e.g., if a third party makes a more competitive bid), the offeror
may extend the initial offer period by a period negotiable with the
Takeover Commission but must then provide equal treatment to holders
who have already tendered their securities. The holders who have al-
ready tendered may withdraw from the first offer to accept the more
favorable second offer.262 If the offeror extends a more favorable volun-
tary tender offer following its initial offer, and no third party has
extended a competing offer, the offeror must grant a subsequent im-
provement to holders who tendered in the initial offer. This requirement
applies to a period determined by the offeror in its offer but may not be
less than twelve months.263 If a third party makes a more favorable pub-
lic tender offer within the period, the initial offeror may submit a
competing offer but is not obligated to extend the improved offer to
holders who have already tendered.26
The Takeover Code requires anyone who obtains control over a tar-
get company to extend immediately a tender offer for the remaining
securities of a target company to all other holders in certain circum-
stances, known as a mandatory offer.265 Anyone who (1) controls a
259. This includes exchange offers within the meaning of § 2(1) of the Securities
Trading Act and the purchase of option rights in the securities of the target company. Id. art.
12, at 9.
260. Id.
261. Id. art. 13, at 10.
262. Id. art. 14, at 10.
263. Id. art. 15, at 10-11 (bringing the Takeover Code closer in line with the six-month
time limit for subsequent improvements in Great Britain).
264. Id.
265. The 1998 amendment to the Takeover Code replaced the original majority share-
holder standard with a more inclusive controlling shareholder standard. Furthermore, a
mandatory offer must now be extended immediately, rather than within 21 months. Ex-
planatory Remarks, supra note 238, at 2.
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majority of the target company's voting rights ;266 (2) is entitled to exer-
cise the majority of voting rights alone or jointly, based on an
agreement with other holders; (3) has the right to appoint or remove the
members of the administrative, managing, or supervisory body of the
target company; or (4) reaches a share of voting rights that would have
constituted a percentage of voting rights equal to at least three-quarters
of the share capital present and entitled to vote for the first resolution
passed at each of the three preceding target company shareholder meet-
ings, has obtained control.267
If a holder obtains control of a company with its corporate seat in
Germany or abroad and thereby obtains remote control over another
company with a registered seat in Germany and whose securities are
admitted for trading on a German exchange, the holder need not make a
mandatory offer to the minority shareholders of the remotely acquired
company, unless the main purpose of the transaction was to obtain con-
trol of the remote company. Furthermore, the mandatory offer
requirement does not apply if the controlling holder obtains control
temporarily (to place the securities with third parties) or unintentionally
(and immediately relinquishes it) or if the controlling holder and the
target company intend to approve specified corporate resolutions within
eighteen months after the holder obtains control.268 If the resolutions are
not passed, or if the parties abandon their intention, the controlling
holder must extend the mandatory offer immediately.269
266. Including the voting rights attributable to the holder by applying § 22(1) of the
Securities Trading Act, mutatis mutandis. Id. at 1.
267. Id. at 1-3. The holder obtains control at the moment of closing of the legal trans-
action which grants the purchaser the ability to exercise the rights arising from the securities,
i.e., the moment of acquisition of the last share (or other influential possibility) that confers
control. Id. at 2.
268. The parties must declare their intention to the Executive Office immediately after
the holder obtains control. The specified resolutions include the following:
an agreement between enterprises (Unternehmensvertrag) pursuant to
§§ 291 et seq. of the Stock Corporations Act;
the integration of the target company pursuant to §§ 319 et seq. of the
Stock Corporations Act;
the change in the corporate form of the target company pursuant to
§§ 190 et seq. of the Transformation Act;
the merger of the target company pursuant to §§ 2 et seq. of the Trans-
formation Act;
or [resolutions] of the target company with respect to an exemption from
the obligation to make a mandatory offer, provided that in this last case
the controlling holder of securities may not exercise his voting rights;
269. Id.
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If the controlling holder has not purchased any additional securities
after obtaining control and before extending the mandatory offer, the
mandatory offer price must be reasonably related to the highest German
stock exchange price within the three months before the holder obtained
control.270 If the controlling holder has purchased additional securities of
the target company in that period, the mandatory offer price must be the
weighted average of the prices of those purchases.27'
A target company must publish its reasoned comment regarding the
tender offer within two weeks of the offer announcement.272 Following
the publication of a public tender offer, the executive or managing body
of the target company 73 may not take any measures that might be ad-
verse to the interest of the security holders until the publication of the
offer outcome.274 The security holders' interest in taking advantage of an
offer demands that the target company's administration remain neutral.
Prohibited measures include resolutions regarding "the issuance of new
securities[,]" "a substantial change in the assets or liabilities of the tar-
get company[,]" or "the conclusion of agreements outside the scope of
ordinary business activities[,]" but does not include "ongoing capital
measures," the fulfillment of pre-existing contracts, or "measures ex-
pressly approved by the general assembly in the event of a public tender
offer.
, 27 5
VI. A CASE STUDY: THE IMPACT OF SECURITIES REGULATION ON
THE VODAFONE AIRTOUCH OFFER FOR MANNESMANN
With a leading presence in the telephone markets of twenty-four
countries and more than ten percent of a global mobile market that ana-
lysts expect to reach one billion subscribers by 2003, the merger of
Anglo-American Vodafone AirTouch ("Vodafone") and German Man-
nesmann ("Mannesmann") creates a world telecommunications leader. 76
270. Id. at 3. The 1998 amendment changed this calculation. The old calculation was
based on the current market price, with a floor not less than 25 percent below any price that
the controlling shareholder paid in a 6-month period before the shareholder reached the
threshold. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 17, at 12-13.
271. Explanatory Remarks, supra note 238, at 3 (to the extent that this weighted aver-
age price is higher than the three-month calculation noted above).
272. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 18, at 14.
273. This includes the executive or managing bodies of companies related to the target.
Id. art. 19, at 14-15.
274. Id.
275. Id. The catalog of defensive measures that would substantially change the value of
the target company (e.g., poison pills, dilution of capital, substantial changes in the com-
pany's assets, the conclusion of unusual agreements) is not intended to be exhaustive. Id.
276. Vodafone-Mannesmann: What Next?, EcONOMIST, Feb 12, 2000, at 68.
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The merged Vodafone-Mannesmann ("Vodafone-Mannesmann") will
soon offer wireless Internet access and continental single-rate charg-
ing to the seventy-million-consumer European mobile phone market,
at least two years ahead of the United States."' The merger company
accounts for thirteen percent of the FTSE All Share index."' In addition
to providing interesting insight into the future of mobile telephony, the
Vodafone-Mannesmann merger illustrates the structure of a sophisti-
cated hostile cross-border offer.279
Vodafone announced an interest in strengthening its existing long-
standing relationship with Mannesmann on November 12, 1999. Chris
Gent, Vodafone's CEO, met with Klaus Esser, chairman of Mannes-
mann's management board, to set forth the strategic case for combining
the two companies and various terms of a proposed offer. Dr. Esser re-
jected the offer, and Mannesmann released a statement describing it as
inadequate, not in the best interests of its shareholders, and not strategi-
cally attractive. Mannesmann filed an application with the U.K. High
Court to block Goldman Sachs International from acting on behalf of
Vodafone, claiming the bank had promised not to act for a third party
seeking to acquire Mannesmann and had a conflict of interest. The High
Court later dismissed the application, calling it "completely hopeless."
After the failure of further negotiations, Vodafone put the proposal di-
rectly to Mannesmann shareholders in a November 19 press release,
whereupon Mannesmann's supervisory board recommended that its
shareholders not tender their shares in the offer.280
To avoid violating securities laws in the various jurisdictions, Vo-
dafone used two separate offer documents for its exchange offer. All
holders of Mannesmann shares and ADSs in the United States received
a U.S. prospectus, while holders of Mannesmann shares who were not
U.S. persons or were not in the United States received an international
offer document.2 ' German law governed Vodafone's offer for Mannes-
mann shares. Vodafone acceded to the Takeover Code,282 and the
277. Id. (the first wave will come in the form of GPRS (general packet radio service),
which is twice as fast as 56k dial-up modems; the second will be EDGE (enhanced data rate
for GSM evolution), seven times as fast; the third will be UMTS (universal mobile telecom-
munications system), which will offer genuine broadband capacity).
278. See FINANCIAL TIMES, supra note 222.
279. See generally Vodafone AirTouch Offer for Mannesmann AG Exchange Offer Pro-
spectus (Dec. 23, 1999), at http://www.vodafone-update.com [hereinafter Exchange Offer
Prospectus].
280. Under the German Takeover Code, Mannesmann was required to promptly pub-
lish its recommendation regarding the offer, but no later than two weeks after the publication
of the German offer document. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 18, at 14.
281. Exchange Offer Prospectus, supra note 279, at 63.
282. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 21, at 16.
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Takeover Commission confirmed that the terms of the offer complied
with the Code.
The SEC granted Vodafone and its investment banks exemptive re-
lief from the provisions of Rule lOb-13, allowing Vodafone and its
banks to purchase Mannesmann shares during the offer.283 The SEC
conditioned its relief on the following conditions:
[1] [there would be] no purchases or arrangements to purchase
Mannesmann shares otherwise than pursuant to the offer
being made in the United States;
[2] if any purchases [were] made that [were] not pursuant to the
offer, the disclosure of the possibility of such purchases
[had to be] included prominently in the offer documents;
[3] Vodafone AirTouch and financial institutions acting on its
behalf [had to disclose] in the United States information re-
garding such purchases to the extent such information [was]
made public in Germany pursuant to the German Takeover
Code;
[4] Vodafone AirTouch and financial institutions acting on its
behalf [had to provide] to the SEC, upon request, a daily
schedule of all purchases of Mannesmann shares made by
any of them during the offer including size, price per share
and manner of purchase; and
[5] Vodafone AirTouch and financial institutions acting on it
behalf [had to comply] with any applicable rules of German
283. The banks, Goldman Sachs and Warburg Dillon Read, also sought permission to
engage in
[1] effecting brokerage transactions on an agency or riskless principal basis
for customers,
[2] purchasing and selling Mannesmann shares as part of their portfolio and
asset management activities, subject to certain restrictions,
[3] certain hedging activities in connection with positions in derivative con-
tracts in place prior to the announcement of the offer, certain index-
related activities and their market-making in derivative securities relating
to the Mannesmann shares,
[4] certain index arbitrage and program trading transactions,
[5] borrowing and lending Mannesmann shares, to the extent that such trans-
actions are not in substance a purchase by the dealer [managers] or their
affiliates, and
[6] certain market-making activities in derivative securities relating to Man-
nesmann shares.
Exchange Offer Prospectus, supra note 279, at 64.
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authorities, including the German Takeover Code and the
rules of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.2
The 1 Ob- 13 exemption addressed Vodafone's intent to comply with
the Takeover Code.285 Pursuant to the Takeover Code and U.S. law, the
offer had to remain open for an initial offering period of not less than
twenty business days, and no more than sixty calendar days.286 No with-
drawal rights were available, and the Takeover Code would only have
required such rights had a third party made a more favorable offer for
the target which the bidder did not match within ten business days.8 7
The SEC granted Vodafone relief concerning compliance with the no-
tice extension requirements of Rule 14e-l(d) and the prompt payment
requirements of Rule 14e-l(c) promulgated under the Exchange Act."'
Vodafone had to publish the outcome of the offer without undue delay,
which the Takeover Commission generally views as five business days
after the end of the offer period.289
Vodafone commenced its exchange offer to U.S. holders on De-
cember 24. U.S. holders received 53.7 Vodafone ordinary shares, 98
which are traded on the London Stock Exchange, for each Mannesmann
share or ADS tendered. Mannesmann shares are listed on the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange and various other European stock exchanges, and its
ADSs are traded on the over-the-counter market in the United States,
but are not listed on NASDAQ or any U.S. national securities ex-
change.29' The offer closed on March 27, 2000. Approximately 98.62%
of Mannesmann issued share capital tendered, and the listing office of
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange admitted Vodafone shares for trading.292
284. See Exchange Offer Prospectus, supra note 279, at 63-64.
285. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 21, at 16.
286. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 11, at 9; 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-1(a)
(2000).
287. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 14, at 10.
288. Exchange Offer Prospectus, supra note 279, at 64.
289. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 231, art. 7, at 8.
290. While Vodafone only offered U.S. holders ordinary shares in exchange for Man-
nesmann shares or ADSs, holders could later exchange them for Vodafone ADSs. Dividends
on Vodafone's ADSs are paid in U.S. dollars, whereas dividends on the ordinary shares are
paid in pounds sterling, the ADSs trade on the New York Stock Exchange, whereas the ordi-
nary shares do not trade on any U.S. exchanges, and unlike the ordinary shares, trading of
the ADSs in the U.S. is not subject to U.K. stamp tax.
291. Exchange Offer Prospectus, supra note 279, at 46-50.
292. Press Release, Vodafone AirTouch, Final Results of Offer for Mannesmann (Mar.
30, 2000) at http://www.vodafone-update.com.
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CONCLUSION
The Cross-Border Rules are one of the SEC's recent efforts to
maintain the competitiveness of the U.S. securities markets while up-
holding its mandate of investor protection and have met with cautious
enthusiasm from most commentators. The U.S. system's reliance on
the statutory regulation of the Williams Act stands in contrast with the
German approach of self-regulation. Interestingly, German practitio-
ners note that the self-regulatory Takeover Code has found considerable
acceptance and application since its implementation as well, despite (or
perhaps as a result of) the lack of detailed rules."3 While mandatory
regulations provide a clear legal framework and more efficient protec-
tion by courts, proceedings can be particularly costly to a target
company's shareholders. Incumbent management often benefits from
the delays associated with the legal proceedings. 94
As the internationalization of capital markets continues apace, na-
tional systems of securities regulation compete and interact with one
another.9 Sophisticated U.S. market participants have been able to cir-
cumvent the U.S. regulatory structure by going abroad, and less
sophisticated investors have often been simply excluded from tender
offers. The Cross-Border Rules are an unequivocal attempt to satisfy
these U.S. investors and to adapt securities regulation to the changing
realities of capital markets. Though the problem of conflicting tender
offer procedural requirements will likely continue until the SEC makes
greater strides towards regulatory harmonization, the exemptions con-
tained in the Cross-Border Rules will undoubtedly benefit many U.S.
investors and may marginally reduce some of the compliance costs for
participants.
293. See SCHUSTER & ZSCHOCKE, supra note 236, at 72.
294. Id. at 56.
295. Licht, supra note 19, at 635.
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